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ABSTRACT 
Digital forensic readiness within the law enforcement community, especially at the 
local level, has gone mostly unexplored. As a result, a current lack of data exists that 
examines the digital forensic readiness of individual agencies, the possibility of proximity 
relationships, and correlations between readiness and backlogs. This quantitative, cross-
sectional research study sought to explore these issues by focusing on the state of Maryland. 
The study resulted in the creation of a digital forensic readiness scoring model that was then 
used to assign digital forensic readiness scores to thirty (30) of the one-hundred-forty-one 
(141) law enforcement agencies throughout Maryland. It was found that an agency’s 
proximity to a major resource center (hub) did not positively or negatively influence 
readiness. It was also found that agencies with higher digital forensic readiness scores may be 
more likely to exhibit backlogs as a result of external agency dependencies. It should be 
noted, however, that digital forensic readiness scores should not be viewed as a reliable 
predictive indicator for the existence of backlogs. These findings establish a baseline for the 
state of Maryland that can be used to monitor, sustain, or improve levels of digital forensic 
readiness within the state or in a broader national context; it has the potential of enhancing 
public safety and the field at large. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the world of digital forensics, some of the keys to conducting a successful 
investigation include the ability to adequately respond to an incident and having a 
combination of the right people, processes, tools, and resources to support the process through 
to litigation (van Baar, van Beek, & van Eijk, 2014). In relation to law enforcement efforts, 
the stakes are even higher as the products produced during the digital forensics process must 
be able to withstand significant scrutiny (Garrie & Morrissy, 2014). At present, research is 
sparse and speculative regarding the ability of law enforcement agencies within individual 
states to process digital evidence (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010). In addition, a gap 
currently exists within the body of knowledge regarding proximity relationships of law 
enforcement agencies to major metropolitan areas. It is not fully understood if these 
relationships increase, decrease, or have no effect on digital forensic readiness postures or 
evidentiary backlogs.  
To this effect, this chapter contains the foundational knowledge to establish the 
relationships between the research problem and the research objectives when examining law 
enforcement agencies within the state of Maryland using a quantitative cross-sectional 
approach. First, the motivation for the research will be presented, followed by the background 
of the problem, which includes a high-level examination of some of the key areas relating to 
digital forensics. The statement of the problem is then provided, followed by the objectives of 
the research. Finally, this current chapter is summarized, and the structure of the remainder of 
this dissertation is presented.  
Motivation 
In today’s modern society, it is rare not to see someone carrying or actively utilizing 
some form of digital technology. These devices create digital trails that can paint pictures of 
the people that have used them and the events in which they have been used (Sammons, 
2012). From a law enforcement perspective, this information can be invaluable during an 
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investigation; however, there is a specific process that must be followed in order for this 
evidence to be legally obtained and considered admissible as evidence in a court of law (US-
CERT, 2008). To complicate matters, the rules and laws governing this type of evidence can 
vary by jurisdiction and are continually evolving as courts begin to better understand digital 
technology (Borisevich et al., 2012; Cassim, 2017; Losavio et al., 2019; Pollitt, Caloyannides, 
Novotny, & Shenoi, 2004). Understanding the law enforcement community and its 
obligations in relation to digital evidence is one way to understand why active and ongoing 
research in this field is essential.  
Cybercrime is on the rise globally with criminal entities leveraging the anonymity of 
technology to their full advantage (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2019; United States 
Department of Justice, 2018). Compounding the issue is a lack of communication and 
resource sharing among law enforcement agencies (Hollywood & Winkelman, 2015). One 
problem that can arise as a result of these factors are backlogs, which result when the 
evidence exceeds the availability of resources needed to process the evidence. It must be 
noted that the definition of backlog is subjective (Sacco & James, 2015). As backlogs of 
evidence grow worldwide, so do the opportunities for criminal exploitation of an already 
fragile system (Scanlon, 2016).  
While certain populations are more frequently targeted by cybercriminals, it must be 
understood that every individual has the potential to become the victim of cyber-crime 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017). This presents a problem as “[c]ybercrime research 
suggests that analogous to traditional crime, victims are more likely to be offenders” (Weulen 
Kranenbarg, Holt, & van Gelder, 2017). While outside the scope of this research, this suggests 
that backlogs, which have been noted as a concern within the law enforcement community, 
may increase the chance of future victimization as a byproduct of delays in justice (Scanlon, 
2016).  
One such example of the prevalence and potential impact of backlogs during an 
investigation can be found when examining a case in Maryland, as was reported by Watts 
(2017). This particular case involved digital evidence that sat in an evidentiary backlog for 
several months (Watts, 2017). The suspect, later convicted of numerous sex crimes involving 
minors, was not held in custody, for a period of time during the investigation, as a direct result 
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of a backlog of digital evidentiary items at the state’s crime lab (Watts, 2017). This time 
presented as an opportunity for continued victimization.     
This case, one of many, demonstrates the immediate need to examine backlogs and the 
factors that may influence these backlogs, such as the proximity relationships to resources. 
Examining individual agency postures within an area where backlogs are known to have 
occurred can generate valuable datasets that may assist localities under examination. 
Furthermore, these datasets could serve as baselines for future research directed towards the 
creation of universal process models designed to decrease or eliminate backlogs and improve 
digital forensic readiness postures throughout the country.   
Maryland 
Maryland, a small state on the east coast of the United States, is estimated to be the 
home to more than 6 million people (United States Census Bureau, 2018a). With a total area 
of 12,193^2 miles, the general population density equates to roughly 496 people per square 
mile (Maryland Department of Natural Resources, 2019). Like other states, this population is 
dispersed with large numbers of people being centered in and around major metropolitan 
areas (Cohen, 2015; Cubit, 2019).  
What makes this state particularly interesting from a research perspective is the 
distance relationships between two major cities; Washington, D.C., which sits to the east of 
the center of the state and Baltimore, MD, which sits slightly north of the center of the state 
(see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Map of Maryland (Google, n.d.) 
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The geographic locations of these two cities create somewhat of a population bubble. 
From a law enforcement perspective, this creates some interesting challenges, some of which 
may be common to other states throughout the United States. As such, this presented as an 
excellent opportunity to examine proximity relationships and its potential impact on digital 
forensic readiness.  
To further keep things in context, Washington D.C. serves as the nation’s capital. This 
federal enclave, on its own, is home to more than 700,000 people (United States Census 
Bureau, 2018b). The city is also the home to dozens of federal agencies, the Whitehouse, and 
other prominent structures and attractions. Security is of the utmost importance as throughout 
history, both people and places within the city have been the targets of various forms of 
terroristic style attacks (Ellis, 2014; Phillips, 2006; Stein, 2016). Digital evidence is becoming 
more common in these types of cases, as was indicated in the indictment of Christopher Paul 
Hasson ("United States v. Christopher Paul Hasson," 2019). In this case, digital evidence 
seized subsequent to an unrelated warrant revealed evidence that suggested that the defendant 
was possibly planning a terror type attack on key members of congress in the region ("United 
States v. Christopher Paul Hasson," 2019). While cases like these are not necessarily the 
norm, they do demonstrate the need for digital forensic readiness throughout the region. This 
research focuses on those agencies within the state that could potentially be tasked with 
investigating such cases.  
During this research, it was found that one-hundred-forty-one (141) state-specific, 
non-federal agencies met the criteria to be considered an active law enforcement agency for 
the purpose of this study. While more agencies were identified during an examination of the 
state provided list, it was determined that some of the agencies listed were either defunct or 
were healthcare facilities that may have private security or special police as opposed to 
regular sworn officers (Department of Public Saftey & Correctional Services, n.d.). It should 
be noted that while special police do have arrest powers, their powers typically only extend to 
the property to which they are assigned (Maryland State Police, n.d.). For some agencies, such 
as those assigned to schools, the distinction was harder to establish based on the limited 
availability of publications and other publicly available information. As such, many of the 
school agencies identified as part of the vetting process were still considered during this 
study. These populations are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.  
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Of the policies listed for these agencies, none appeared to provide policies specifically 
relating to digital forensics (Department of Public Saftey & Correctional Services, n.d.). 
While this did not necessarily suggest that polices do not exist, it was an area of concern. This 
is an important part of this research as digital forensic readiness is partially supported by 
defined policy and procedure (Flory, 2016). As such, a question was presented in the survey, 
which was distributed to the agencies to determine if these types of policies do, in fact, exist. 
These findings were then used as a metric at both the state and county levels to assist in the 
establishment and assignment of digital forensic readiness scores.  
Background of the Problem 
Digital forensics, as a defined science, is a relatively new and evolving discipline with 
challenges constantly emerging that push the bounds of current digital forensics capabilities 
(Pollitt, 2010; Zawoad & Hasan, 2015). With noted upticks in the number of reported 
cybercrimes since 2013, the use of digital evidence in support of both criminal and civil 
litigation is expected to increase (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017, 2019; United States 
Department of Justice, 2018). Since cybercrime is not localized to a specific state or region, 
there is a present need for law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local levels to 
have some semblance of digital forensic readiness. 
The concept of digital forensic readiness, like the field itself, is relatively new and 
evolving (Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard, & Lonie, 2015). Some definitions for digital forensic 
readiness consider all phases of the digital forensics process from the initial inception of a 
program through to the decommissioning of a program (Elyas et al., 2015). The models that 
have resulted tend to look at the process holistically and do not always fully consider 
variables such as resource, time, or legal constraints. Several authors have suggested that this 
may be due to a lack of data that would allow for the proper consideration of these variables 
(Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010; Harichandran, Breitinger, Baggili, & Marrington, 2016) 
Thus, the resulting processes are rather prescriptive in nature. Currently, there is no one 
universally accepted digital forensics model or methodology; however, certain phases appear 
in many of the published models (Decusatis, Carranza, Ngaide, Zafar, & Landaez, 2015). The 
next two sub-sections discuss these phases, along with an overview of the tools designed to 
support them. 
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Digital Forensic Process Models  
The digital forensics process can be supported through the implementation of various 
digital forensic process models. These models, grounded in theory and law, guide the process 
by taking specific tasks and assigning them to phases (Carroll, Brannon, & Song, 2008). 
While some of the earlier models prescribed a linear approach, more recent models have 
emerged that seek to address the dynamic nature of the field as well as the co-mingling of 
disciplines (Losavio et al., 2019; Mushtaque, Ahsan, & Umer, 2015). Some within the field 
have even sought to create universal models that also consider the need for adaptability 
(Kohn, Eloff, & Eloff, 2013). These could be regarded as lofty goals as progress is generally 
impeded by a lack of standardization within the field, especially in regards to the cross-
jurisdictional admissibility of evidence (Antwi-Boasiako & Venter, 2017). These issues 
combined make the establishment of universal metrics or the creation of universal process 
models difficult when differences can exist from county to county even within the same state.  
Research such as this that considers these types of variations provide the means to 
formulate baselines. In this research, a question was posed to the respondents to determine if a 
standard operating procedure exists that considers the “identification, presentation, and 
collection of digital evidence” (Flory, 2016). While not necessarily seeking to identify the 
specific models employed, the question provides insight into localized readiness. This 
information can then, in turn, be used to identify trends that could lead to the adoption of a 
unified approach at the state or county levels. These concepts are examined in greater detail in 
Chapter 2.  
Digital Forensics Tools 
Supporting the models and phases noted above are various types of hardware and 
software-based tools. As with process models, a lack of standardization with the development 
and application of supporting tools has contributed to an environment that can potentially 
open the door to various legal challenges (Losavio et al., 2019; Pollitt et al., 2004). Processes 
such as tool validation, lab accreditation, and specific training can help alleviate some of these 
concerns; however, agencies must still be adaptable to legal, regulatory, and technological 
changes (Pollitt et al., 2004). In Chapter 2, an examination of these types of tools, along with 
legal and resource concerns, will be presented.  
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Statement of the problem 
Digital forensic readiness within the law enforcement community is considered poorly 
understood and overly subjective, which has resulted in an environment of unpredictability 
and unreliability (Elyas et al., 2015; Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010). Despite similar 
findings across studies, there has been little progress in expanding the body of knowledge on 
the subject, especially at the individual state level (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010; 
Harichandran et al., 2016). Nationally, digital forensic readiness assessments are not being 
conducted at the state or local levels on a consistent basis to determine individual baselines or 
to identify relationships among variables that may influence these postures (Elyas et al., 2015; 
Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010; Goodison, Davis, & Jackson, 2015; National Institute of 
Justice, 2006; Rogers & Seigfried, 2004; Scanlon, 2016).  
At the state level, this type of information can be useful in identifying potential 
resource gaps as well as areas where backlogs may be occurring (Flory, 2016). By examining 
digital forensic readiness of law enforcement agencies within the state of Maryland data can 
be derived that can be used by state officials, academia, and the law enforcement community 
at large to not only understand the factors that contribute to backlogs but also how to account 
for the proximity effect of large metropolitan areas in regards to overall digital forensic 
readiness postures of individual agencies. 
Objectives of the Project 
The objective of this research was to contribute to the current body of knowledge by 
answering the following research questions:  
RQ1. What is the current digital forensic readiness posture of law enforcement 
agencies in the state of Maryland?  
RQ2. Does an agency's proximity to or availably of external resources influence its 
internal digital forensics posture?  
RQ3. What impact, if any, does an agency's internal digital forensic readiness posture 
have over any internal backlogs of digital forensics evidence? 
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The study also sought to support the following hypotheses:  
HP1. Law enforcement agencies within the state of Maryland that are within a twenty-
mile radius of the two primary central hubs, Baltimore, MD, and Washington D.C., 
will exhibit a more mature digital forensic readiness posture.  
HP2. It is hypothesized that all agencies, regardless of their distance between the hubs, 
will exhibit similar digital evidence backlogs when viewed in relation to the 
populations of the county or municipality in which the agency is located. 
Currently, there is limited research on these topics, which is a significant limiting 
factor. The only known datasets that exist for comparative purposes are few, with most of 
these being outdated (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010). While a qualitative study would 
prove useful in furthering the body of knowledge, it was determined that qualitative data 
could be viewed as subjective rather than objective. As such, one of the research goals was to 
avoid subjectivity by using a quantitative methodology and a cross-sectional approach. This 
type of methodology and approach better serves the community at large by providing metrics 
and results that can be leveraged for future comparative research.   
Assumptions 
This study is predicated on several assumptions: 
A1. It is assumed that the data provided by each respondent is true and accurate and 
represents the agency's current state, not a future or past state. For example, it was 
determined that it could be possible that the respondents could provide answers that 
were forward-thinking, which can introduce bias. This potential bias is discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 3.   
A2. It was assumed that the agencies identified and included in the population group 
were not sub-agencies or affiliates. Sub-agencies would be defined as agencies that 
fall under a higher authority. For example, a Maryland State Police barracks would be 
a sub-agency or affiliate of the Maryland State Police. Data provided by agencies that 
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self-identified as sub-agencies or affiliates were excluded from the analysis presented 
in Chapter 4.  
Significance of the Approach 
This research is significant to the field as there has been a noted lack of this type of 
localized data collected within the United States (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010; 
Harichandran et al., 2016). This type of data and analysis is necessary for identifying factors 
that may influence digital forensic readiness within the law enforcement community at large. 
These factors can be used to derive metrics and establish baselines with the goal of decreasing 
digital evidentiary backlogs and increasing the chances of digital evidence being successfully 
used at trial. Furthermore, the data collected along with the establishment of digital forensic 
readiness scores set the stage for comparative purposes that may assist in the standardization 
of the field. 
Dissertation Organization 
The structure of this dissertation has been organized to guide the reader through the 
research conducted from inception to completion. Chapter 1 presented the reader with the 
foundational knowledge to establish the relationships between the problem and the research. 
The motivation for the research was presented along with information about the state of 
Maryland, which was the primary focus of this study. The background of the problem was 
then presented and included details relevant to the field. The problem was then stated, 
followed by the research questions and hypotheses that guided the research. Chapter 2 
provides an examination of digital forensic readiness by examining the concept holistically, 
identifying trends, knowledge gaps, and areas of concern. Chapter 3 presents the research 
methodology utilized to answer the three research questions posed. Chapter 4 presents and 
discusses the results of the research conducted following the methodology presented in 
Chapter 3. The document is formally concluded in Chapter 5 with a summary of this work 
along with ways in which this work can be potentially leveraged for future research. 
22 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter has been prepared to provide the reader with a comprehensive overview 
of the state of the literature. First, a high-level overview of the literature will be provided and 
will serve as the foundation. Each concept is then independently examined to add additional 
depth as well as to provide additional details on the theories, practices, and knowledge gaps 
identified within the literature. 
Digital, or computer forensics, is a field in its relative infancy (Du, Le-Khac, & 
Scanlon, 2017). While much research has been conducted on various ways to improve the 
field, there are areas of the field, such as localized need that have gone mostly unexplored 
(Flory, 2016). Localized digital forensic readiness postures, especially of law enforcement 
agencies, is important data that can be leveraged by local, state, and federal officials to 
identify deficiencies and gaps and for the purposes of resource allocation and process 
improvement (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010; Harichandran et al., 2016). 
 Several prominent studies do exist, such as those conducted by Hickman and Peterson 
(2004), the Institute for Security Technology Studies (2002), and the National Institute of 
Justice (2006), but many of these could be considered dated for the purposes of comparative 
analysis (Flory, 2016). More recent studies have been conducted and include works by Flory 
(2016), Henry, Williams, Wright (2013), Gogolin & Jones (2010), and Harichandran et al. 
(2016), but presently datasets, especially those that examine areas independently, are far and 
few between. To fully appreciate the depth of digital forensic readiness, several key areas 
within the literature need to be examined.  
The first topic presented in this section is the evolution of the digital forensics process, 
along with tools that are used to support the process. This is then followed by an examination 
of needs analysis and how this approach has been used to explore digital forensic readiness in 
prior research. The concepts of digital forensic readiness in law enforcement is then 
presented. This is followed by sections on resource availability, training and education, and 
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legal and regulatory environments, all of which can affect digital forensic readiness. Backlogs 
are then explored in-depth as this issue was a key consideration and motivating factor during 
this research. Advanced methodologies will then be examined. Finally, this chapter will be 
summarized.  
Digital Forensics Models & Phases 
Within the law enforcement community, there are many different approaches that can 
be utilized to facilitate the digital forensics process. One well known digital forensics model 
that has assisted in guiding the development of other models is the Department of Justice’s 
Digital Forensic Analysis Methodology (Carroll et al., 2008; Decusatis et al., 2015). From a 
very high level, the model consists of three primary integral phases. These phases include 
preparation and extraction, identification, and analysis (Carroll et al., 2008). These phases 
are meant to be conducted in a waterfall fashion; however, certain scenarios can cause 
iteration either forward or backward (Carroll et al., 2008). These phases and their subphases 
will be detailed throughout this section. 
Preparation & Extraction 
The preparation phase is a critical phase in the digital forensics process. The phase is 
predicated on proper authority to begin and the application of inductive reasoning to 
determine if the data sources have the possibility to contain information relevant to the 
original request (Carroll et al., 2008; Sammons, 2012). To clarify, an original request is a 
request that originates prior to the current phase and specifically details case level information 
that serves as both the guide and boundaries for the examiner. If these conditions are met, the 
examiners can move forward with an acquisition of the evidence.  
An acquisition of a digital device consists of creating a bit-for-bit copy, otherwise 
known as a forensic image, of the original source (Carroll et al., 2008). The acquisition can be 
at the logical (file system) or physical (entirety) levels. Careful consideration must be made to 
determine the most appropriate method of acquisition as the primary goal at this stage is to 
ensure the integrity of the original evidentiary item. Methods and technologies do exist to 
promote integrity, with new and novel approaches being created to address emerging 
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challenges, but certain newer technologies are complicating the process (Novak, Grier, & 
Gonzales, 2019).  
 It should be noted that the acquisition process can become extremely difficult in 
environments that leverage cloud-based technologies. For example, Raju and Geethakumari 
(2019) noted that in cloud-based environments, one must consider the acquisition of virtual 
items such as vRAM, vdisks, and other dynamic data sources. While supporting technologies 
are being produced to address these types of challenges, many of the underlying methods are 
still theoretical or experimental (Novak et al., 2019; Raju & Geethakumari, 2019). When this 
is mapped back to the concept of readiness, it must be determined if the investigating 
authority understands these challenges and their implications. This leads to the assumption or 
expectation that the individuals performing an acquisition possess the proper training and that 
the tools being utilized are validated at an agency or industry defined frequency (Carroll et al., 
2008). As with any scientific process the results must be repeatable. Challenges and training 
aside, once the acquisition has occurred, the process must be validated, which in digital 
forensics is referred to as maintaining evidentiary integrity.   
The way the integrity of an image is validated is by using a hashing algorithm that 
derives a unique identifier that represents the data being collected. Hashing, unlike 
encryption, is a one-way function. In other words, the identifier produced by the algorithm 
cannot be used to reproduce the data. This process is illustrated in the following figure (See 
Figure 2):  
 
Figure 2. Hashing Process 
 Carroll et al. (2008) creatively describe this process as fingerprinting. The hash of the 
original item must match that of the original source; however, there are situations where the 
hashes may not match in which case it is advised that the examiner stop the process and seek 
guidance from the individual or entities that submitted the original request for analysis 
(Carroll et al., 2008). It should also be noted that it is a commonly accepted practice to use 
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more than one hashing algorithm to “minimize the risk of hash collisions and harden the 
overall process against hash collision attacks” (Spreitzenbarth, 2015).  
 Some of the more commonly utilized hashing functions are the message-digest 
algorithm (MD5) and the secure hashing algorithm (SHA). When selecting the appropriate 
function, one should consider both stability and performance. Roussev (2009) notes that MD5 
hashing is the most popular choice as hashing can occur at a rate of “400Mbytes per second 
on a single core.” As such, MD5 should be considered when performing a hash of the entire 
contents of a drive. On the other hand, SHA-1 is particularly attractive for file sorting large 
datasets in memory (Roussev, 2009).  
Identification 
The identification phase is where the examiner will attempt to identify items relevant 
to the original request (Carroll et al., 2008). Digital devices can contain a significant amount 
of data. This data can present as images, videos, logs, and other various files and file formats. 
Examiners, at this stage, must review each of these items to determine their type and possible 
relevance to the case (Carroll et al., 2008).   
In some newer models, this phase has been referred to as the examination phase 
(Decusatis et al., 2015). This phase can prove somewhat complicated as items may be 
obfuscated by way of abstraction or secured by way of encryption. Either of these scenarios 
may slow the process significantly. This is also a point of consideration from a readiness 
perspective as these challenges require individuals with specific training and specialized tools 
that may exceed the operating budgets of smaller entities (Flory, 2016). When resources are 
not available, one possible outcome is an evidentiary backlog, which may persist until 
external or other sources are sought that can provide assistance (Flory, 2016). Outside of 
resource concerns, there are other possible impediments to this process.  
Another possible challenge that examiners may face during this phase is the possibility 
of uncovering an incriminating item that falls outside the scope of the original request (Carroll 
et al., 2008). Carroll et al. (2008) provide a hypothetical example of an investigation centered 
around tax fraud where, during the course of the identification phase, images of child 
pornography are identified. In such a situation, it is important to cease all activity, escalate the 
request, and obtain additional and appropriate authority to proceed (Carroll et al., 2008). 
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While this may cause delays during an investigation, it is an imperative action as case law is 
constantly evolving that may impact the process (Baer, 2014). These types of items, as well as 
the originally scoped items, may also lead to additional data sources. 
In the world of the Internet of Things (IoT), the connectivity of devices creates an 
expansive web that examiners must consider when conducting an investigation. Emails are 
transmitted and stored in multiple locations, refrigerators can store and send data, and your 
toaster may be monitoring and storing audio recordings in the environment in which you have 
placed it. Carroll et al. (2008) note that these items can be important sources of evidence that 
may be used to build a stronger case or support additional charges; however, this can come at 
a price. Specifically, the investigators will need to determine if there will be a “return on 
investment” and if these new leads are worth it (Carroll et al., 2008).  
The ability to answer these types of questions map back to the concept of digital 
forensic readiness; however, considering the possible depth, one must ask the question; what 
is a realistic level of readiness? As has been noted, there is no consensus at present on this 
topic (Flory, 2016; Harichandran et al., 2016). Assuming the investigation does not stall as a 
result of issues such as these, the process will continue into the analysis phase.  
Analysis  
The analysis phase is one in which all the aforementioned items are connected in a 
logical, coherent fashion. Carroll et al. (2008) note that this is the stage where the how, who, 
where, when, and what really begins to come to light. One way this can be accomplished is 
through the generation and presentation of timelines.  
Timelines can be used to represent events, such as interactions with data artifacts, 
listed in chronological order. Investigators and examiners can leverage timelines to piece 
together events. These events can either prove or disprove a theory and should never be 
presented in a way that could create false or misleading assumptions (Casey, 2011). This can 
sometimes prove to be a challenge for examiners as the judicial system allows for certain 
evidentiary items to be presented in a light unintended by the original examiner (Casey, 
2011). From a readiness perspective, ensuring that examiners possess training that covers 
issues such as the ethical application of evidence should be considered. This is especially 
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important during this phase, because the products of the phase, as presented by Carroll et al. 
(2008), will lead to the generation of a forensic report. 
 Initial Staging & Final Stages 
As was noted earlier, there are several additional steps to the forensics process that 
must take place both before and after the phases that were noted in the previous sections. 
These steps are integral to the process as they set the stage from inception through to the 
reporting and closeout. These remaining steps were withheld up to this point due to how these 
phases can potentially be misperceived without prior knowledge of the legal system and its 
relation to digital forensics. These steps include the obtaining and imaging of forensics data, 
the forensics request, forensic reporting, and case level analysis (Carroll et al., 2008).  
During the preparation and extraction phase, it was noted that data duplication of the 
source would occur. What may not have been clear from this description is if the examiners 
are working from an already duplicated item or the original item in question. To clarify, 
Carroll et al. (2008) note that the obtaining and imaging forensic data phase, which is listed 
as the first item of the process, can be a by-product of the identification phase. Earlier, it was 
mentioned that certain artifacts might lead to additional sources. Assuming this to be the case, 
the process would need to be reset, which is where this phrase can come into play. This phase 
may also trigger additional forensics requests, which would then follow the waterfall model 
unless another iteration is required. This is represented by the following illustration (See 
Figure 3) presented by Carroll et al. (2008): 
 
Figure 3. DOJ – Digital Forensics Process Overview (Carroll et al., 2008) 
In the model by Carroll et al. (2008), forensic reporting comes after the analysis phase 
but is not considered as part of the core process. Decusatis et al. (2015) diverges from this 
mindset and considers this phase as the fourth core. Reporting is itself an involved and 
complicated task that considers the entirety of the process. It is noted that the report should 
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contain both the results and limitations of the examination, which would suggest a conclusion 
of the process (Decusatis et al., 2015). This differs from Carroll et al. (2008) model, where the 
process has the potential to iterate based on the results of the case level analysis step. 
Research by Mushtaque et al. (2015) noted that practitioners found many of these early 
models to be confusing. It was further suggested that condensing these phases impeded 
adaptability and failed to consider the prospects of new and emerging issues (Mushtaque et 
al., 2015). 
Supporting Tools  
The digital forensics process can be supported by a number of tools. These tools can 
consist of commercially available and open-source software products, hardware-based 
products, and various policy models. While there may be variations in brands or approaches, 
there are several tools and process models that are common and will likely be encountered 
during a review of a digital forensics investigations unit (Abulaish & Haldar, 2018). Two of 
these models have already been introduced in the prior section, and additional models will be 
discussed later in this chapter. This section will focus specifically on software and hardware-
based tools, their application, and significance to the concept of digital forensic readiness. 
Software 
Software-based digital forensics tools have been designed to assist in streamlining 
some of the steps of the digital forensics process. Tools such as EnCase, Forensic Toolkit 
(FTK), Axiom, and X-Ways contain various features that can facilitate the processes of 
acquisition, analysis, and reporting. Like forensics models, there is no one universally 
accepted software-based tool, and certain cases may require a combination of tools in order to 
meet the objectives of an investigation. Subsequently, due to the possibility of various 
resource constraints, individual agencies may be limited to only specific applications 
(Gogolin & Jones, 2010). Understanding both the capabilities and limitations of these types of 
applications will now be presented in relation to their place in the digital forensic process 
from a digital forensic readiness perspective.  
EnCase, FTK, Axiom, and X-Ways are all commercially available tools that require 
annual licensing. At their face, they are all designed to assist the examiner in completing some 
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of the more tedious tasks that are involved in an investigation. For example, Carvey (2014) 
discussed the concept of direct and indirect artifacts that can be generated during an 
investigation. Direct artifacts are ones that are a product of an incident or are relevant to an 
incident. In contrast, indirect artifacts are ones that are generated as a result of some common 
system process (Carvey, 2014). Indirect artifacts can become problematic, especially in 
Windows environments, where processes running in the background can generate a plethora 
of activity that, for lack of a better term - muddies the water (Carvey, 2014). These tools can 
assist in sifting through the mud, making it much easier to identify relevant artifacts. From a 
readiness perspective, the ability to streamline processes, such as these, may increase the 
speed in which evidence gets processed. Of course, this is hypothetical, as other resource 
constraints or even backlogs may already exist that negate these immediate benefits. 
Additionally, cost may be a consideration, especially with the three tools noted above. 
Smaller agencies, or even larger agencies, may find themselves moving towards cheaper or 
open-source options to satisfy their needs.  
There are quite a few free alternatives to some of the aforementioned commercial 
packages. One well known freely available package is the Sleuth Kit (Autopsy), which is a 
platform similar to EnCase (Altheide & Carvey, 2011). Now, it could be reasonably argued 
that Autopsy does not offer nearly as many features as the commercially available tools. Its 
application should not immediately be ruled out, though, as it still offers important features 
such as timeline analysis, keyword searching, and even the ability to leverage custom modules 
(Decusatis et al., 2015). In fact, this particular kit has been suggested for inclusion in a rather 
novel methodology that is completely composed of open source tools (Decusatis et al., 2015). 
In addition to Autopsy, entire Linux distributions exist that contain freely available tools that 
support these forensics process. Two well-known platforms are CAINE and Kali (C.A.IN.E., 
2018; Offensive Security, 2019). These packages, some of which are open-source, tend to be 
community supported and are updated on a regular basis to satisfy the needs of forensic and 
cyber security practitioners alike. The selection of tools from this category may be the result 
of resource constraints or personal preference.  
As was just noted, the selection of any tool needs to be carefully considered in relation 
to resources and the ability of the examiner to operate them (Pollitt et al., 2004). In addition, 
these tools need to be considered and treated as scientific instruments as their reliability can 
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be called into question during litigation (Losavio et al., 2019; Pollitt et al., 2004). Examiners 
should strive to avoid these types of challenges by practicing proper validation in order to 
preserve the integrity of the field and their agency or organization.  
Hardware 
Digital forensics investigations would be significantly impeded without hardware to 
interface with. Without some way to indirectly interface with the device(s) or data in question, 
the examiner would be left with no option but to conduct an examination on the source. It has 
been stated that this would inevitably compromise the integrity of the evidence in question 
(Rajamaki & Knuuttila, 2013). This would also create significant problems and is counter to 
both accepted practice and applicable case law (Cole, Gupta, Gurugubelli, & Rogers, 2015). 
As such, this section examines common digital forensics hardware and its relationship to 
digital forensics and digital forensic readiness.  
Like software tools, hardware-based tools specifically designed to support the 
forensics process may come at a significant financial cost. Forensic workstations, for 
example, which are powerful machines designed specifically for the purpose of conducting 
speedy and efficient investigations, can run in excess of $10,000 (Digital Intelligence, 2019). 
The features of these machines, along with various bundled commercial software packages, 
can further drive the cost. When deciding on such devices, one should have a realistic 
expectation of operational capacity. 
From a digital forensic readiness perspective, the question could be raised; should an 
agency possess equipment that far exceeds the current or anticipated need based on case 
growth? Furthermore, is case growth a product of increased population or increased reliance 
and use of digital devices? These are important issues that agencies must consider when 
investing in forensic hardware; however, there are cheaper alternatives. 
McMillon (2003) found that it was theoretically possible to build a forensic 
workstation for under $150.00 by using parts commonly found in corporate environments. 
While the system proposed may not support a large caseload or contain sufficient resources to 
process large data sources in a timely and efficient manner, it does demonstrate that 
scalability is possible when faced with resource constraints (McMillon, 2003). It should be 
further noted that a system such as the one proposed may not pass judicial scrutiny 
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(McMillon, 2003). This is where the concepts of accreditation and validation truly come into 
play, as was discussed in detail by Sammons (2012). It was found that with proper training 
and scoping, it may be possible to mitigate some of these concerns (McMillon, 2003; 
Sammons, 2012).    
Needs Analysis  
In the world of needs assessment (analysis), there are three primary models: decision-
making, discrepancy, and marketing (McKillip, 1987). The decision-making model is 
designed to examine synthesis in applied research (McKillip, 1987). The discrepancy model is 
popular in the field of education and “emphasizes normative expectations” (Pruett, 2006). The 
marketing model is used by organizations, using a feedback approach, to explore and adapt to 
the needs of their target audience (Pruett, 2006). Understanding why specific models are 
selected during the research process provides insight into not only how data was potentially 
solicited, but also how that data was interpreted.  
During this review, it was found that early studies utilized a hybrid approach that 
combined the decision-making and discrepancy models (Rogers & Seigfried, 2004). It was 
found that this approach had proven particularly useful when comparative datasets were 
limited or non-existent; however, it was further noted that there is a potential for bias when 
the data gathered using this approach is over generalized (Rogers & Seigfried, 2004). In fact, 
Rogers and Seigfried (2004) specifically noted in their study, the risks of overgeneralization 
and the need for larger datasets with clearly identified demographics. Research by both Flory 
(2016) and Gogolin and Jones (2010) resulted in similar findings despite the research having a 
more localized focus. Both studies also resulted in raising more questions and ways in which 
to define the concepts of readiness from a needs-based perspective (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & 
Jones, 2010).  
Harichandran et al. (2016) examined the concept of need within the digital forensics’ 
community using a novel approach that examined future needs based on current perceptions. 
Using a survey-based instrument, various areas such as education, training, and support were 
presented to the digital forensics’ community. Demographic questions were provided to assist 
in the analysis of the data (Harichandran et al., 2016). The resulting data were then compared 
to previous research conducted by Rogers and Seigfried (2004). It was found that several 
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categories of need remained the same; however, some areas shifted (Harichandran et al., 
2016). While Harichandran et al. (2016) presented possible reasons for the shifts, the primary 
takeaway, from a needs perspective, is that these areas, just like the field, tend to be dynamic. 
The dynamic nature noted in the Harichandran et al. (2016) study also supported previous 
findings that need-based survey instruments should be modified and adjusted so that 
additional areas or current concepts can be further explored (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 
2010; Harichandran et al., 2016).  
Digital Forensic Readiness in Law Enforcement 
The origin of the concept of digital forensic readiness as a founding principal can be 
debated. Derived from the concept of organizational readiness, the focus can be described as a 
method for implementing a digital forensics program that is both cost-efficient and reliable 
(Tan, 2001). Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard, and Lonie (2015) noted that this concept had evolved 
over time with significant contributions from Pangalos and Katos (2009), who introduced the 
idea of controls that promote both the facilitation and anticipation of various digital forensics 
incident types. Further refinement of these concepts has resulted in process models that 
encompass the entire forensics process and promote adaptability (Elyas et al., 2015). Digital 
forensic readiness from a law enforcement perspective is no different except that many 
agencies are bound by budgetary, staffing, legal, and technical constraints that prevent or 
impede an agency’s ability to reach various levels of readiness (Dilijonaite, 2018; Karie & 
Karume, 2017).    
For example, in a study of law enforcement agencies within the state of Michigan, it 
was found that many agencies were significantly lacking in their digital forensic readiness 
posture (Gogolin & Jones, 2010). Specifically, these agencies lacked the workforce and 
resources, or a combination thereof, to be able to investigate a crime involving digital 
evidence (Gogolin & Jones, 2010). Six years later, Flory (2016) would conduct a similar 
study that examined law enforcement agencies within the state of Indiana. Flory (2016) found 
that a majority of respondents, sixty-eight percent (68%), reported not having a digital 
forensics expert on staff with eighty percent (80%) of that same population citing a lack of 
funding. Interestingly enough, Harichandran et al. (2016) found that even private sector 
entities felt that the law enforcement community was under-resourced. Identifying these areas 
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is a crucial part of being able to determine the overall digital forensic readiness posture of a 
given geographic area; however, quantifying this has proven to be a challenge (Flory, 2016; 
Gogolin & Jones, 2010; Rogers & Seigfried, 2004).  
Quantifying digital forensic readiness in law enforcement is difficult due to a lack of 
standardization in the field in regards to both educational requirements and jurisdictional 
differences in the judicial framework (Flory, 2016; S. Garfinkel, Farrell, Roussev, & Dinolt, 
2009; Garrie & Morrissy, 2014; Gogolin & Jones, 2010; Harichandran et al., 2016; Rogers & 
Seigfried, 2004). At present, there are no specific set of metrics to be leveraged to generate a 
readiness score that could be universally applied. This is likely due in part to a lack of 
willingness by law enforcement agencies to self-report during these types of studies (Flory, 
2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010). In lieu of universal metrics, both digital forensic readiness 
postures and readiness scores need to be calculated after each study and ideally for each 
agency.  
This section examined the concept of digital forensic readiness in the law enforcement 
community. A review of the literature determined that readiness varied across the board and 
that the concept was subjective at best. It was determined that measuring readiness would 
prove difficult as there is a lack of standardized metrics. Furthermore, data could not be 
identified for agencies within the state of Maryland, which means that there is no working 
baseline. These factors directly influenced the methodology and approach selected for this 
research, as is further detailed in Chapter 3.  
Resource Availability 
In order to conduct a digital forensic investigation, resources must be available. 
Resources, for the purpose of this review, are considered both human and physical assets. In 
one of the earliest studies, it was found that law enforcement agencies lacked both the human 
and physical assets required to successfully conduct digital forensics investigations (Institute 
for Security Technology Studies, 2002). Comparing these early findings to more recent 
findings provides insight into how the digital forensics community is slowly evolving to 
address issues relating to resource allocation and availability.   
In one of the first studies of its kind conducted in 2002, researchers found that the 
technologies supporting the digital forensics process did not seem to align with the needs and 
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skills of the user base (Institute for Security Technology Studies, 2002). For example, it was 
found that certain assumptions were being made about the skillsets of end-users, which 
impeded the ability of “less experienced” investigators to conduct accurate and timely 
investigations (Institute for Security Technology Studies, 2002). While this type of finding is 
not necessarily unique to the field, it does raise significant concerns in a field where results 
can impact both the life and liberty of those directly and indirectly involved during an 
investigation.  
In 2006 a comprehensive needs analysis of forensic service providers was prepared for 
Congress (National Institute of Justice, 2006). While this research covered the entire forensics 
community, the results validated previous findings and suggested that the field was not 
maturing at a sufficient rate (National Institute of Justice, 2006). During this stage, the 
concept of standardization was explored as a way to address some of the resource concerns; 
however, budgetary and training impediments were identified with no long term viable 
solutions being offered (National Institute of Justice, 2006). Upon examination of more recent 
studies, similar findings and conclusions were noted (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010).  
Resource availability, especially human resources, may continue to decline as the 
needs of the field evolve. Harichandran et al. (2016) noted that advanced skills, such as 
reverse engineering, are beginning to fall within the scope of a forensic examiner’s duties. 
These types of demands on members of the law enforcement community are yet to be 
understood as research has not yet been conducted that assesses attrition or retention as a 
result of continuing education requirements. Considering that practitioners within the law 
enforcement community may also be assigned other duties, as was indicated by Flory (2016), 
the potential exists for both burnout or attrition. In addition, it has been suggested that 
monetary compensation may be a motivating factor as private sector entities typically pay 
more money for the same work (Goodison et al., 2015).  
This section examined resource availability and some of the challenges facing law 
enforcement agencies. It was determined that as the demand for digital forensics examiners 
grows, law enforcement may have problems obtaining or retaining qualified personnel. In 
addition to staffing, it was found that budgetary concerns will likely continue to be a problem 
that will affect an agency’s ability to keep pace, from a technological perspective, with 
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growing cyber threats (Caviglione, Wendzel, & Mazurczyk, 2017). Determining resources 
availability is a critical element in establishing a digital forensic readiness baseline. 
Training & Education 
Training and formal education in the field of digital forensics is an important part of 
obtaining and maintaining the skills needed to conduct a digital forensics investigation. With 
legal, regulatory, and technological environments continually changing, there is an apparent 
need for law enforcement personnel involved in digital forensics work to possess minimum 
educational requirements (Flory, 2016; Garrie & Morrissy, 2014). Based on a review of the 
literature, it was found that the concept of what constitutes sufficient qualified levels of 
training are somewhat subjective (Flory, 2016; Garrie & Morrissy, 2014; Harichandran et al., 
2016). In addition, it was also noted that there were differences in training standards among 
various law enforcement agencies (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010). In this section, a 
review of the literature is presented that seeks to examine these gaps and inconsistencies in 
training standards within the law enforcement community.  
Gogolin and Jones (2010) noted in their study that “[t]raining levels for digital crimes 
provide insight into the level of expertise and commitment to dealing with such crimes.” The 
inference being drawn by this statement is that training is indicative of commitment, and a 
lack of training would suggest that a given agency is not committed to dealing with such 
crimes. This statement by itself warrants further examination, as it does not seem to consider 
variables such as resource allocation adequately. Flory (2016) found that resources may have 
a direct impact on the training and or the training needs of a given agency. Resource 
constraints do not necessarily relieve a given agency of providing training to officers or 
support personnel that deal directly with digital evidence. In fact, training gaps may serve as 
grounds to challenge the admissibility or reliability of a given evidentiary in question (Bulbul, 
Yavuzcan, & Ozel, 2013; Garrie & Morrissy, 2014). This then begs the question, what are the 
minimum baselines?  
As the field of digital forensics evolved, tools began to emerge that automated 
processes that were previously manually performed by the examiner (Garrie & Morrissy, 
2014). These tools lightened both the load and training needs of the examiners; however, legal 
principals still mandated that evidence submitted by individual experts must meet certain 
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minimum standards (Garrie & Morrissy, 2014). In relation to digital forensics, these standards 
include the ability of the examiner to produce evidence and hypotheses that are reliable 
(Garrie & Morrissy, 2014). Furthermore, the support of said hypotheses must be presented in 
such a way so that the process is repeatable (Garrie & Morrissy, 2014). While tools can aid in 
the process, they are not a direct substitute for both experience and education.  
Specifically, examiners still need to understand how computers and their components 
function and must be able to provide enough detail to quantify their understanding of the field 
and the evidence in question (Garrie & Morrissy, 2014). It must be kept in mind that digital 
forensics is comprised of a combination of fields, one being computer science, which is by 
itself a highly technical field, so finding a proper balance can be difficult absent an industry-
wide consensus, which at this time has not been reached (Govan, 2016; Harichandran et al., 
2016).  
There has been ongoing research in the field of digital forensics, and forensics 
sciences in general, in regards to what levels of training and education should be required, if 
any, in order practice (Lim, 2008a). While suggestions have been made that would require 
practitioners to demonstrate a specific skill or set of skills, these standards have not been 
widely adopted -- at a possible detriment to the field (Melbourn et al., 2019). In fact, 
Melbourn et al. (2019) noted that the field of forensic sciences had been the target of criticism 
for lack of universal certification. Until these issues are resolved, agencies have two primary 
options to quantify education. These options include certification or a formal degree pathway. 
Certification 
In the world of digital forensics, there are a plethora of vendor-specific and vendor-
neutral certifications. Vendor-specific certifications, such as the EnCase Certified Examiner 
(EnCE) certification, may demonstrate competency in a specific tool, whereas a vendor-
neutral certification, like the Basic Computer Forensic Examiner (BCFE), may demonstrate a 
broader skillset. Attempts have been made to sort through the countless certifications and 
assign them either a value score, ranking, or way to identify competency categories, but the 
task has proven quite difficult (Lim, 2008a, 2008b; National Commission on Forensic 
Science, 2016). In other words, the value may be subjective.  
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During a comprehensive review of industry certifications, it was found that 
certification requirements could vary considerably (Lim, 2008b). To avoid the stigmas 
associated with test-based certifications, it was noted that several certification authorities were 
requiring a combination of practical exams, demonstrated experience, and validated field 
experience (Lim, 2008b). While not foolproof, adding layers to the certification framework 
should theoretically increase the chances that the practitioner will possess the skills advertised 
by the certifying authority. While outside the scope of this research, determining the factual 
basis of this hypothesis could strengthen support for those considering certification as a 
pathway and would strengthen the support for any readiness metric derived from this area.   
Formal Degree 
Since 2010, there has been a steady increase in the number of digital forensics degree 
programs being offered by colleges and universities in the United States (Digital Forensics 
Association, n.d.; S. L. Garfinkel, 2010). This increase may be partially attributed to the rise 
in demand for the field, which is expected to grow by thirty-two percent (32%) between 2018 
and 2028 (Bureau of Labor Statistics & U.S. Department of Labor, 2019). Like certifications, 
quality and content may vary as some schools offer online programs with no hands-on 
practice (i.e., hardware interaction), while others provide more robust in-person courses. In 
addition, the time to obtain a formal degree may take longer depending on the number of 
credit hours required. Formal degrees may also require courses not relevant to the field.   
Certification & Degree Considerations 
As has been suggested in the previous two sections, without adopted standardization, 
state and local officials would have to determine, on a case by case basis, if certification or a 
degree program is suitable to meet their specific education requirements and needs. When 
determining value, an agency should consider both the credibility of the program or 
certification and the return on investment with the return on investment factoring “costs of 
labor, material, and so on” (Wiles & Reyes, 2011). Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
there may be a lack of emphasis on both degrees and certifications specific to digital forensics 
within the law enforcement community (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010).  
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State-Level Digital Forensics Training Postures 
This section details the digital forensics training postures for the state of Michigan and 
Indiana. The results from Michigan were derived from a study conducted by Gogolin and 
Jones (2010). The results from Indiana were derived from a study conducted by Flory (2016). 
Michigan 
Gogolin and Jones (2010) found, in their examination of law enforcement agencies in 
Michigan, that it was difficult to quantify the level of training or expertise personnel 
possessed. This was partially due to the fact that there is a level of subjectivity when it comes 
to the quality of the training received (Gogolin & Jones, 2010). This finding was interesting 
and suggested a need for research that examines and establishes metrics that evaluate the 
overall quality of a specific training program or course. This may need to occur at the 
individual state level to consider jurisdictional differences from a legal perspective (Losavio 
et al., 2019). Since no means to establish quality existed, Gogolin and Jones (2010) instead 
considered the frequency of training against the length of time the agency operated their 
digital crimes unit (if any). Surprisingly, two agencies within the sample self-identified as 
conducting digital forensics investigations utilizing staff that had no training in digital 
forensics (Gogolin & Jones, 2010). This finding was particularly interesting and maybe the 
product of legal loopholes. 
During the study, it was noted that the state of Michigan required individuals involved 
in the field of digital forensics to be licensed (Gogolin & Jones, 2010). The requirement of 
licensure in a field may provide the public with a means of identifying those individuals that 
meet specific standards to be able to practice within that given field (Department of the 
Treasury Office of Economic Policy, Council of Economic Advisers, & Department of Labor, 
2015). On the converse, it has been argued that licensing, especially in the field of digital 
forensics, may deprive individuals the right to practice when licensing requirements are 
arbitrary (Lonardo, White, & Rea, 2012).  It was found that a loophole in the Michigan law 
existed that exempted law enforcement agencies from licensure (Gogolin & Jones, 2010). 
This provided the opportunity for agencies to conduct digital forensics investigations using 
unqualified individuals. This, of course, did not exempt agencies from challenges raised in 
regards to the spoilage of evidence of related cases - both criminal and civil (Manes, 
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Downing, Watson, & Thrutchley, 2007). While instances of erosion of public trust were not 
identified, these instances demonstrate the potential for such erosion and may support the 
push towards standardization at the state level.  
Indiana 
Flory (2016), in her examination of law enforcement agencies in Indiana, also noted 
deficiencies in training. It should be noted that the populations for Indiana and Michigan are 
6,483,802 and 9,883,640, respectively (United States Census Bureau, 2010a, 2010b). For 
comparative purposes, these findings suggest that differences in the population may not 
influence training or training budgets and may suggest other issues systemic to law 
enforcement. In addition, Flory (2016) noted that a lack of training might be the result of the 
utilization of paid outside resources. One of the more interesting and creative ways that an 
agency, outside the state, has dealt with this type of training dilemma is by deputizing 
volunteers who possessed significant technical training (Gogolin & Jones, 2010). While 
novel, this concept presents potential gray areas that are considered outside the scope of 
exploration for this review. It should be noted that no such cases were reported in Indiana; 
however, there were variations in the surevy instruments used which may account for a lack 
of data.  
Flory’s (2016) study suffered from a low response rate. As such, the responses had to 
be generalized to identify trends and establish relationships. It was found that only twenty-
four percent (24%) of the responding agencies had an individual on staff with a certification 
or degree specific to the field of digital forensics (Flory, 2016). From that same group, it was 
noted that sixty percent (60%) had at least attended some sort of training related to the field 
(Flory, 2016). It is difficult to draw inferences from the small sample, so there may or may 
not be cause for concern when it comes to training in Indiana. As Flory (2016) noted, these 
areas may need to be further examined using a new instrument.  
Section Summary  
Technology is still rapidly evolving. As a result, the training and education needs of 
law enforcement personnel practicing digital forensics must be carefully and continuously 
considered. For example, agencies must now consider the challenges and complexity of IoT 
devices that are becoming a more frequent feature of investigations (Cameron, 2018). Based 
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on a review of the literature, the field may benefit from a standardization of educational 
requirements; however, unless a way is found to consider each jurisdictional difference, this is 
not likely to happen. At present, states and local agencies should attempt to identify the most 
appropriate training and education requirements that meet their specific needs.  
Legal & Regulatory Environment  
Whether it be in support of criminal or civil litigation, for the digital forensics process 
to be considered legitimate, certain rules of law must be abided by (Borisevich et al., 2012; 
Losavio et al., 2019). A challenge for digital forensics practitioners and attorneys alike is 
keeping up to date with the laws of the land. To further complicate things, it has been noted 
that these laws can vary by jurisdiction (Losavio et al., 2019). While considered mostly 
outside the scope of this research, the global legal environment must still be examined as 
current technology presents the chance of cross-jurisdictional challenges (Antwi-Boasiako & 
Venter, 2017). 
There have been calls within the digital forensics community to develop standards for 
the admissibility of evidence across jurisdictional lines (Antwi-Boasiako & Venter, 2017). 
From state to state and country to country, differences in standards of admissibility of digital 
forensic evidence can vary greatly. Losavio et al. (2019) consider the field of digital forensics 
as an “interdisciplinary activity” that requires careful consideration and coordination of both 
judicial and technical representatives.  
From a technical perspective, the reliability of tools has been a point of contention for 
years, with the quest for universal standardization being a significant challenge (S. Garfinkel 
et al., 2009). As a science, digital forensics is premised on the concept of repeatability. In the 
early years of digital forensics, it was found that this issue was a significant concern; 
however, it was determined that case law existed that could be used as a guide (Pollitt et al., 
2004). Pollitt et al. (2004) noted that there are three major cases that have had a significant 
influence over the field. These cases include: 
• ("Frye v. United States," 1923) 
o Cornell Law School (n.d.-b) noted that this case was the first to establish a 
baseline in determining if an “expert’s scientific testimony” could be 
considered admissible. This case called into question the methods in which 
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evidence had been obtained and whether the methods were generally 
accepted practice as determined by other experts within the same given 
field (Cornell Law School, n.d.-b). It should be noted that the Daubert 
standard has generally replaced the Frye standard, but some jurisdictions 
may still apply it (Cornell Law School, n.d.-b).  
• ("Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.," 1993) 
o “The Daubert standard is the test currently used in the federal courts and 
some state courts. In the federal court system, it replaced the Frye standard, 
which is still used in some states” (Cornell Law School, n.d.-a). 
• ("Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael," 1999) 
o This case led to the determination that Daubert could be applied to the 
testimony of non-scientists and non-scientific testimony (Cornell Law 
School, n.d.-a).  
These cases set the stage for the field of digital forensics, and other scientific 
disciplines, within the U.S. by defining the concepts of experts and admissibility. Under the 
Daubert standard, it was found that great emphasis could now be placed on the reporting 
process, which, if done correctly, could possibly negate the need for in-person expert 
testimony (Garrie & Morrissy, 2014). Unlike physical testimony, though, the report would not 
be optional (Garrie & Morrissy, 2014).  
With the possibility of a report being presented in lieu of physical testimony, the 
content and methods contained within the report, and its author should be able to withstand 
scrutiny (Garrie & Morrissy, 2014). Assuming the expert is qualified, then there is flexibility 
in the quality of the content in relation to the approach of the examination (Garrie & Morrissy, 
2014). For example, Garrie and Morrissy (2014) present the case of Nucor Corp v. Bell 
("Nucor Corp v. Bell," 2008).  
During the presentation of evidence by the expert, in this case, a hypothesis was 
presented that demonstrated that anti-forensic methods were utilized (Garrie & Morrissy, 
2014). The specific method of anti-forensics employed was a zeroing technique, which is a 
common way of erasing data by writing all zeros or random blocks of zeros to a source drive 
(Garrie & Morrissy, 2014; Meffert, Baggili, & Breitinger, 2016). In situations where this 
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technique is employed, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to recover useful data depending 
on the specific type of storage device question (Gutmann, 1996). As a result, the expert had to 
hypothesize why the data was in the state it was in (Garrie & Morrissy, 2014). This was 
accomplished by developing a method that replicated the findings on the drive (Garrie & 
Morrissy, 2014). The opposing party raised objections to these theories; however, the court 
found that the expert had presented the evidence in both a scientific and repeatable fashion, 
which Garrie and Morrissy (2014) cited as a “nod to the Daubert factors.” This case 
demonstrated that the courts were willing to afford an expert latitude in their approach 
assuming that the results that are generated are repeatable (Garrie & Morrissy, 2014).  
Backlogs  
Backlogs can be an unfortunate byproduct of a lack of digital forensic readiness. In 
law enforcement, backlogs can result in criminals not being prosecuted in a timely manner or 
not at all (Watts, 2017). One practice within the law enforcement community, especially at the 
local level, is to send evidentiary items to state crime labs to be processed (Scanlon, 2016). 
This process is not always effective.  
In Michigan, Gogolin & Jones (2010) noted that “[m]any agencies turned the 
investigation over to the Michigan State Police Computer Crime Lab, where turnaround time 
for investigation was widely reported to be one to two years.” Similar occurrences have been 
noted in Maryland. It was reported that evidence in a child sexual assault case sat unprocessed 
at the Maryland State Police Computer Crime Lab (MSPCCL) in excess of 5 months (Watts, 
2017). While the evidence was eventually processed, and the suspect arrested, the case 
brought to light the fact that 14 cases were currently sitting in a backlog at the MSPCCL 
(Watts, 2017).  
According to Quick and Choo (2014), as cited in Lillis, Becker, O’Sullivan, and 
Scanlon (2016), there are several factors that can contribute to backlogs. These can include, 
“[a]n increase in the number of devices that are seized for analysis per case; “[t]he number of 
cases whereby digital evidence is deemed pertinent is ever increasing,” and “[t]he volume of 
potentially evidence-rich data stored on each item seized is also increasing” (Lillis et al., 
2016). Each of these examined in context provides some rather interesting insights. 
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With the rise of the IoT phenomenon, the number of devices that may present 
evidentiary potential in criminal and civil litigation increases (Lillis et al., 2016). It is 
anticipated that the number of IoT devices will continue to increase with decreases in 
technology costs, global population growth, and high consumer demand for these types of 
devices (Harmon, Castro-Leon, & Bhide, 2015). The increase in seizure rates of these types of 
devices, as noted by Quick and Choo (2014), may represent an increased awareness in the law 
enforcement community in relation to the potential value of these types of devices from an 
evidentiary perspective. This rise may also indicate an increased overall ability of law 
enforcement to deal with this type of evidence.  
Communications logs (i.e., text messages, email), pictures, videos, and other data 
sources are often identified and can be used to support criminal and civil investigations 
(Kouwen, Scanlon, Raymond Choo, & Le-Khac, 2018). With the increased prevalence of 
technology, there is a higher probability that an artifact will be present that can be utilized 
during an investigation and, finally, at trial (Lillis et al., 2016). Increases in the number and 
types of reported cyber crime further support this notion (United States Department of Justice, 
2018). 
As was noted in previous sections, it takes both time and resources to process digital 
evidence. Each item seized should be analyzed; however, there are situations in which the 
return on investment must be considered (Carroll et al., 2008). Resource constraints may be a 
significant limiting factor; however, any item seized should still be processed. Items not 
processed could be considered in a state of backlog depending on the circumstances.  
It has been suggested that increasing resources could help alleviate backlogs, but this 
may not be a realistic or viable solution (Scanlon, 2016). Scanlon (2016) proposed a novel 
approach to this problem that would seek to address these resource issues by implementing a 
system that avoids duplicated efforts. It was noted that duplicated efforts were a primary 
reason for backlogs and that by merely automating processes and rethinking the digital 
forensics workflow, you could not only free up resources but also “future-proof” the process 
(Scanlon, 2016). Of course, approaches like these have yet to be implemented on a large 
scale, so the impact of such systems is currently speculative (Scanlon, 2016). However, these 
types of systems demonstrate that it may be possible to address backlogs by simply re-
thinking or looking at the process holistically. 
44 
Advanced Methodologies  
The digital forensics process and its various stages are best demonstrated by 
examining models. While many models currently exist, some of which were described earlier 
in this chapter; the current digital forensics landscape may require consideration of new and 
advanced methodologies. During this review, one rather novel methodology that was 
identified was a model by Kohn et al. (2013). It was found that this model may have already 
addressed some of the issues identified by Mushtaque et al. (2015). 
One of the main issues identified by Mushtaque et al. (2015) was the lack of 
adaptability of many of the older digital forensics methodologies. These methodologies were 
found to lack flexibility, which in turn created confusion among practitioners (Mushtaque et 
al., 2015). Kohn et al. (2013) model addresses these issues by breaking the core digital 
forensics phases into sub-phases. In addition, the model considers advancements in the field 
and the possibility of universal adaptation (Kohn et al., 2013).  
When examining this model (Kohn et al., 2013), one of the first things to note is the 
many sub-phases. For example, the documentation phase acts as a wrapper for the 
preparation, incident, incident response, digital forensics investigation, and presentation 
phases (Kohn et al., 2013). Each of those phases can contain an additional one to seventeen 
steps and may be dependent on the previous steps (Kohn et al., 2013). By introducing these 
sub-phases and steps, an agency can attempt to map both resources and policies better to 
ensure a smooth operational environment. It should be noted that this type of implementation 
may come at a cost.   
At the micro-level, each step addresses a specific investigational requirement; 
however, operating at the macro level may introduce possible points of failure during an 
investigation. To satisfy the requirements for these phases, there needs to be the proper 
balance of people, processes, tools, and technology. It is often difficult for law enforcement 
agencies to satisfy these requirements for a plethora of reasons, including budgetary concerns 
and human resource limitations (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010; Kohn et al., 2013). 
Identifying these types of gaps can be accomplished in a number of ways, including but not 
limited to, needs-based analysis or stress testing (Flory, 2016).  
Needs-based analysis of the problem can be an effective approach when examining the 
effectiveness of a model; however, previous studies have demonstrated a lack of willingness 
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within the law enforcement to participate in this type of research (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & 
Jones, 2010; McKillip, 1987). Stress testing, on the other hand, could potentially quickly 
identify gaps and concerns. This type of testing is used when one wants to examine the 
limitations of a system by pushing the limits of the system's capabilities (Krishnamurthy, 
2004). Like needs analysis, getting law enforcement to participate in such a test would likely 
prove difficult. Without a willingness to cooperate, data cannot be derived that would allow 
for proper mapping to the steps in the Kohn et al. (2013) model. This may be a significant 
limiting factor when considering these types of advanced models.  
Literature Review Summary 
This chapter presented the current state of the literature by identifying common trends, 
themes, and gaps. The concept of need-analysis and its importance to the field and this study 
were presented. Works that exploded digital forensic readiness in law enforcement were then 
examined. This was then followed by issues relating to resource availability. Issues related to 
training and education were explored in-depth, and it was found that a lack of standardization 
may be impeding progress within the law enforcement community. A comprehensive analysis 
of the legal and regulatory environments that govern the field was also examined, where it 
was found that jurisdictional differences must be considered when examining and drawing 
inferences about related datasets. Finally, the concepts of backlogs and the implementation of 
advanced methodologies were considered.  
This review demonstrated that research examining digital forensic readiness within the 
law enforcement community is still lacking and that the effects of localization are not 
currently fully understood. It was also noted that there was a lack of literature concerning 
localized backlogs. In Chapter 3, the methodology used for conducting this research and 
assessing the digital forensic readiness posture of law enforcement agencies within the state of 
Maryland will be presented.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section contains the specific methodology utilized during this study. As was 
noted in Chapter 1, the purpose of the study was to determine the digital forensic readiness 
posture of law enforcement agencies within the state of Maryland. During the literature 
review in Chapter 2, it was found that a study of this kind had not yet been conducted within 
the state. Studies of a similar nature had been conducted in other states; however, the 
researchers noted gaps in the literature and suggested a need to expand the current body of 
knowledge (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010). These earlier studies served as an important 
baseline and guide for this research. From this information, it was determined that a 
quantitative methodology using survey design and a cross-sectional approach would be the 
most appropriate.  
The remainder of this chapter presents the pertinent details of the selected 
methodology. First, an examination of several common methodologies is presented along with 
their possible relevance to this research. The research questions, hypotheses, and variables are 
then examined. This is followed by a presentation of the population and exclusionary 
considerations. The data collection method is defined and includes details on the solicitation 
packet, the electronic survey, and the collection period. The survey instrument is then 
presented. The limitations to the approach are then considered, followed by both a 
confidentiality and risk assessment. The method of data analysis is examined and contains the 
establishment of the digital forensic readiness score and how backlogs were considered. The 
chapter is then formally concluded with a summary. 
Review of Methodologies 
Ahmed, Opoku, and Akotia (2016) define a methodology as a framework and 
philosophy that relates to the research process as a whole.  In the world of research design, 
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there are many research methodologies that exist. Four of the more common methodologies 
one may encounter are design science, qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods. These 
methodologies exist as a way to guide the research process, with the goal being to satisfy the 
research objectives and answer the research questions in the most comprehensive way 
possible (Creswell, 2014). The selection of a research method can be personal in that the 
researcher should consider how to best translate this information, considering both their 
audience and their own personal experiences (Creswell, 2014). Goulding (2002) takes this 
idea a step further and notes that the selection process is often difficult as the researcher 
begins to ponder their interests, convictions, and beliefs in relation to the research. The 
remainder of this section examines the four aforementioned methodologies and considers their 
appropriateness to the research that was conducted.  
Design Science  
The first methodology for examination is design science. Design science is a 
methodology that is best suited when the research has the potential to or objective of creating 
an artifact that will improve upon a current state (Wieringa, 2014). While the application of 
this methodology was initially considered, it was determined during the literature review that 
data does not currently exist that identifies a specific problem within the state of Maryland 
that would benefit from an artifact. It should be noted that the data from this research may 
serve as a baseline for the future creation of an artifact that could be developed using the 
design science approach. For example, a backlog prioritization or communication system may 
be possible to address the issues related to backlogs identified within the state.  
Qualitative 
The second methodology for examination is the qualitative approach. Qualitative 
research is an inductive approach that is often utilized by those seeking to examine “social or 
human problems” through the lens of the population being examined (Creswell, 2014). It has 
been suggested that this “is an umbrella term” with a primary focus on social life and is often 
nonquantitative by design (Saldaña, 2011). The multidisciplinary aspects of the approach 
allow for flexibility in the interpretation of the data, especially when one seeks to examine 
possible flaws in policies or programs (Saldaña, 2011).  
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During the literature review, and based on the previous considerations, it was found 
that this could potentially be a suitable approach. Several of the questions in the original 
survey by Flory (2016) provided respondents with subjective response options. These 
questions were adapted to this research and included in the survey instrument utilized. As 
such, it was possible to interpret the data through the lens of the population and consider the 
issues as both human and social problems (Creswell, 2014). Using this approach would also 
have allowed for a more in-depth examination of the policies and practices that guide digital 
forensics within the state. These types of insights could also have added to the currently 
limited body of knowledge; however, it was determined that the research would be scoped to 
interpretation and presentation rather than evaluation. In addition, there was a risk that the 
results may be too narrowly scoped and not suitable for broader context evaluation in future 
research.  
Quantitative  
The third methodology for examination, and the one selected for this study, is the 
quantitative approach. Quantitative research, unlike qualitative, is a more structured approach 
that tests “objective theories by examining the relationship among variables” (Creswell, 
2014). Population samples are used to determine statistical significance (Creswell, 2014). 
Lowhorn (2007) adds that the population should consist of the entire group in question 
without consideration of the population density; however, this may be unfeasible. To offset 
this, quantitative research can leverage representative samples (Lowhorn, 2007). The 
populations can then be examined using either experimental or descriptive research 
techniques (Lowhorn, 2007). 
The difference between experimental and descriptive research lies with the 
relationships to the variables (Lowhorn, 2007). Experimental research is considered a more 
robust approach that tests the causational relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables (Lowhorn, 2007). Descriptive research is less prescriptive in regards to 
the valuation of the variables and places emphasis on describing the sample at that point in 
time (Lowhorn, 2007).    
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Mixed Methods  
The fourth methodology for examination is the mixed methods approach. The mixed-
methods methodology leverages the previous two methodologies with the assumption that the 
data can be interpreted in a way that provides deeper meaning and understanding (Creswell, 
2014). Creswell (2014) notes that some of the reasons a researcher may choose this method 
include gaining a better understanding of the instrument used to measure the data, 
understanding needs, and to compare different perspectives. In relation to this research, this 
methodology could have provided significant insight into both the data and the responses. 
This approach would have been appropriate if the research questions were focused on 
causational relationships of individual programs rather than relationships related to proximity. 
Based on the justifications cited by Creswell (2014), future research directed towards 
understanding the programmatic problems or the effectiveness of the survey may be 
warranted.  
Research Questions, Hypothesis, and Variables 
This research focused on establishing a digital forensic readiness posture score for 
each agency; determining the rates of degradation of these scores in relation to the distance 
between Baltimore, MD, and Washington, D.C.; and to determine if the readiness scores 
correlate to backlogs. To focus this research, the following three research questions were 
defined: 
 
RQ1. What is the current digital forensic readiness posture of law enforcement 
agencies in the state of Maryland?  
RQ2. Does an agency's proximity to or availably of external resources influence its 
internal digital forensics posture?  
RQ3. What impact, if any, does an agency's internal digital forensic readiness posture 
have over any internal backlogs of digital forensics evidence? 
 
To guide the research, two hypotheses were proposed. According to Creswell (2014), 
a hypothesis maps variables to a research question or an expected outcome. Hypothese one 
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(HP1) defines the independent variable as the distance and the forensic readiness score as the 
dependent variable. Hypotheses two (HP2) defines the independent variable as the distance 
and the backlogs as the dependent variable. HP2 is a null hypothesis, which is a hypothesis 
that predicts that “no relationship or no significant difference exists between a group on a 
variable” (Creswell, 2014). While Creswell (2014) suggests not selecting both hypotheses and 
research questions together, this method may be appropriate when the hypotheses support the 
research questions. The hypotheses prepared for this research are as follows: 
    
HP1. Law enforcement agencies within the state of Maryland that are within a twenty-
mile radius of the two primary central hubs, Baltimore, MD, and Washington D.C., 
will exhibit a more mature digital forensic readiness posture.  
HP2. It is hypothesized that all agencies, regardless of their distance between the hubs, 
will exhibit similar digital evidence backlogs when viewed in relation to the 
populations of the county or municipality in which the agency is located. 
 
The next section examines the population. It is important to understand the population 
and how it was selected, as this directly maps back to the creation of the research questions 
and the development of the hypotheses. All of this will be tied together in Chapter 4 with the 
examination of the data.    
Population 
The population for this research consisted of all law enforcement agencies within the 
state of Maryland. Law enforcement agencies, for the purpose of this study, included state, 
county, city, and municipal law enforcement agencies as well as any specialized agencies that 
are not classified as federal law enforcement agencies. As was noted in Chapter 1, a total of 
one-hundred-forty-one (141) agencies met the criteria to be considered as an active law 
enforcement agency for the purpose of this study. These agencies were obtained from a public 
website maintained by the state that contained all law enforcement agencies in the state 
(Department of Public Saftey & Correctional Services, n.d.).  
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Exclusions 
Creswell (2014) notes that population samples should not usually be manipulated. As 
such, the original goal of this research was to include all agencies as identified by the state. 
However, it was determined that this would not be the best approach based on questionable 
inclusions in the state's list.  
During an examination of the state list, it was determined that some of the agencies 
listed did not meet the definition of a law enforcement agency for the purpose of this study. 
The agencies excluded from consideration were either defunct or were healthcare facilities 
that may have private security or special police as opposed to regular sworn officers 
(Department of Public Saftey & Correctional Services, n.d.). In addition to the exceptions 
noted above, it was found that some of the agencies listed were assigned to schools. During an 
analysis of these agencies, it was difficult to determine, based on the limited availability of 
publications, whether these agencies were primary law enforcement agencies, sub-agencies, 
or affiliates. As such, only the agencies that could be identified as primary agencies were 
included in the population.  
Data Collection Method 
The study was conducted by first gathering the contact information for all local and 
state law enforcement agencies within the state of Maryland. The process for collecting this 
data included utilizing information provided on a publicly available website maintained by the 
state of Maryland (Department of Public Saftey & Correctional Services, n.d.) along with 
additional web searches for verification purposes. Verification included ensuring that the 
contact email address listed on the state website aligned with the email address on the agency 
site. It should be noted that several discrepancies were identified. These discrepancies related 
to changes in the command structure or other personnel-related changes. Physical addresses 
were also compared for accuracy. All physical addresses were confirmed to be correct. Once 
this information was verified, a solicitation packet was prepared, the electronic survey 
instrument was generated, and the collection period was defined. These items are detailed in 
the following sections.  
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Solicitation Packet 
Once verification had occurred, a solicitation packet was prepared. This solicitation 
packet included a study solicitation letter (See Appendix A), a survey instrument (See 
Appendix B), as detailed in the next section, and a self-addressed stamped envelope. The 
solicitation letter contained information about the study, including the risks. It offered the 
respondent the option to complete the physical survey or complete the electronic version if an 
email address was identified in the previous stage. For tracking purposes, the survey 
instrument contained a unique identifier known only to the researcher. This contact packet 
was then sent through the United States Postal Service (USPS) to the population list that had 
been previously assembled.  
Electronic Survey  
As was previously described, respondents had the option to either mail back the paper 
survey or complete the survey online. The online survey was prepared using the Survey 
Monkey platform. This particular platform was selected due to the fact that it meets or 
exceeds industry standards for confidentiality and security (SurveyMonkey, 2018). It was also 
determined that the platform would provide assistance with securing the approvals required to 
satisfy the requirements for the Dakota State University (DSU) Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) (SurveyMonkey, 2018).  
A link to the survey instrument was distributed to the contact email address identified 
for each agency. Email addresses could not be identified for twenty-seven (27) agencies. As 
such, one-hundred-fourteen (114) emails were sent. This link was sent six business days after 
the solicitation packet was sent. A reminder email would be sent on January 6, 2020. The 
content of these emails can be found in Appendix E. The links were monitored for activity, 
and this information was considered during data analysis, as presented in Chapter 4. 
Collection Period 
The total collection period ran for 36 calendar days from when the original solicitation 
letter was sent. This period ran from December 6, 2019 (06DEC20) to January 10, 2020 
(10JAN20). When the collection period had expired, the electronic survey was disabled. 
Physical surveys were collected for three business days after the online survey was closed. 
This was to account for any delays in the physical mail service. All envelopes containing 
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physical surveys were examined to ensure that the postmark date fell within the survey 
window. Any envelope found to have a postmark date later than the survey end date of 
10JAN20 would be discarded.  
Survey Instrument 
Creswell (2014) notes that survey design is an approach that can be used when the 
researcher seeks quantitative data relating to opinions, trends, or attitudes of a population. 
This study leveraged a modified version (See Appendix B) of a pre-validated survey 
instrument. The original survey instrument (See Appendix C) created by Flory (2016) was 
found to be suitable for this research as the questions provided the means for the creation of a 
digital forensic readiness score. While the survey acted as a good baseline, several additional 
questions needed to be added in order to address some of the research questions.  
Modifications to the survey, as reflected in Appendix B, include the following: 
1. Questions 1, 12, 17, 18: Include the option, prefer not to answer. These additions 
were made in response to feedback by the DSU-IRB. This option affords the 
respondent the option not to answer these specific questions. The inclusion relates 
to questions that could lead to the possible identification of the agency as noted in 
the risk assessment (i.e., department size) and those questions that relate to 
perception, which could impact an agency's reputation.  
2. Questions 3, 5, 6: Include the option I do not know. These additions were made as 
a result of careful consideration of the original questions. The original questions 
assume that the respondent would have knowledge of these topics or that they 
would be able to locate this information.  
3. Questions 21 & 22: These questions were added to gather the data needed to 
analyze issues relating to backlogs. 
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Limitations 
This study was conducted using a cross-sectional approach and captured data and 
attitudes at a specific point in time. It was assumed that the respondents would provide 
responses that were reflective of what is and not what will be. Answers that are not reflective 
of the current state could introduce bias. As such, it may not be possible to delineate between 
these types of responses.   
In addition, the term law enforcement agency is broad and may include organizations 
that would not, as a matter of practice, engage in criminal investigations that include digital 
evidence. Including a question to determine the agency's capacity was considered; however, it 
was decided that introducing such a question could skew the results should the agency 
representative misinterpret the underlying question. Running a pilot study may have allowed 
for the refinement and inclusion of the question, but this was not possible due to time 
constraints. As such, examining each agency’s investigatory practices is considered outside 
the scope of this research. 
Participation in the survey was voluntary. The solicitation packet included details of 
the study and consent material (See Appendix D). Previous studies have demonstrated a lack 
of willingness on the part of law enforcement agencies to participate in these types of studies 
(Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010; McKillip, 1987). At the time the study was conducted, 
the researcher lacked official support from the state. As such, it was understood that the 
response rates had the potential to be low.   
There are limited datasets to compare the data derived from this study. There was only 
one study of a similar nature identified within the past ten years (Flory, 2016). With rapid 
evolutions in technology, even data within the past ten years may not accurately represent 
current trends within the law enforcement community and must be treated with some 
skepticism.  
Confidentiality & Risks 
This section contains the steps taken to ensure confidentiality throughout this study as 
well as the potential risks to the respondent. A formal confidentiality assessment and risk 
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assessment was conducted and presented to the DSU-IRB to ensure the highest levels of 
research ethics and integrity.  
Confidentiality Assessment 
Confidentially was carefully considered for this research. Prior to this study, the 
researcher and committee chair took and passed several Collaborative Institutional Training 
Initiative (CITI Program) training courses. The CITI Program provides training materials that 
cover topics such as ethical research, regulatory oversight, and the proper administration of 
research (CITI Program, n.d.). This training provided the researcher with advanced 
knowledge in research conduct and ethics. From this training, it was determined that 
confidentiality would be a concern and that steps would need to be taken to address these 
concerns. The two primary areas of concern identified were the solicitation of a response that 
identified the agency size and general data security.  
The first area of concern examined related to the solicitation of a response that 
identified the size of the responding agency. It was noted in the Flory (2016) study that it 
could be possible to identify an agency based on the reported size of the agency. Since this 
study considers locality as a driving factor, this area of concern is even more pronounced. To 
address this, survey question one (Q1) was modified to provide a prefer not to answer 
response option. If the respondent selected this option, it would be difficult to identify the 
agency even if the data is attributed to a given locality. Furthermore, the presentation of the 
data was done in a way to generalize the data sources to reduce the possibility of 
identification.  
The second area of concern was the security of the data. This study relied on both 
physical and electronic forms of communication. The physical forms of communication, 
specifically the survey, contained a unique identification code known only to the research. 
This allowed the researcher to determine the locality from where the survey originated. Once 
the survey was received, it was scanned and saved on two encrypted storage devices (primary 
& backup). The physical surveys were then destroyed by using an incineration method.    
For the electronic survey, a unique link was generated for each respondent that could 
be monitored for activity. The link was sent to the email address identified during the data 
collection phase. Just like the physical survey, this provided a way for the researcher to 
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identify localities. To ensure the confidentiality of the electronic data, the researcher 
leveraged the security integrated into the Survey Money platform. All data that was collected 
electronically was downloaded at the end of the collection period and stored on two encrypted 
devices (primary & backup).  
Following the DSU-IRB review, it was determined that these steps would be enough 
to preserve the confidentiality of the respondent and the data. While this section contained 
some implicit risk, it is pertinent to explicitly state each risk as it pertained to this study. The 
next section details each of the risks involved with this study.  
Risk Assessment 
During an analysis of the research design, it was determined that risk was present. The 
risks identified related to the confidentiality of the data being solicited from the respondents 
and how to maintain that confidentiality through the research process. The following risk and 
their mitigations were identified: 
RQ1: There is the potential that the information being solicited could damage the 
reputation of the organization self-identifying. From a research perspective, this must 
be a consideration only to the extent that it does not result in the intentional or 
unintentional exclusion from the population. In addition, state, local, and municipal 
agencies are not corporations and are therefore not considered individuals under the 
law. To mitigate this particular risk, the data was presented in a way (See Chapter 4) 
to obfuscate the responses relating to reputation risk. For example, individual 
readiness scores were assigned to each agency but only reported at the county level or 
higher. In addition, perception-based questions were also only presented at the county 
level or higher. 
RQ2: There is the potential that the information being solicited could become 
compromised. In order to mitigate this risk, it was determined that the data would be 
stored on two encrypted devices (primary and backup) and accessed on air gaped 
devices.  
Each of the mitigations listed would reduce the risk to near negligible amounts. The 
risk was disclosed to the respondents in the introduction to the survey sent with the 
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solicitation packet (See Appendix D). The respondents were provided the necessary contact 
information to contact the researcher, or the DSU-IRB, prior to taking the survey.  
Data Analysis 
For this study, data analysis was performed using a quantitative methodology. 
Quantitative approaches use statistical analysis that seeks to transform raw data into 
information (Omair, 2014). Two approaches within this realm for interpreting data include 
descriptive and inferential statistics (Omair, 2014).  
Omair (2014) notes that the difference between descriptive and inferential statistics is 
that descriptive statistics present a broader interpretation of the data and population. In 
contrast, inferential statistics places emphasis on data subsets. In consideration of both the 
research questions and hypotheses, it was determined that both approaches should be utilized 
to yield maximum usage of the data. The next sections, Digital Forensic Readiness Score & 
Analysis of Backlogs, explains this approach in greater detail.  
Data Forensic Readiness Score 
In each of the previous chapters, the concept of a digital forensic readiness score was 
discussed. During the literature review, it was found that a universal scoring system does not 
currently exist. As such, a system needed to be created to generate these scores for each 
responding agency.  
To ensure compatibility with a quantitative methodology, values were assigned to the 
answers for a subset of the survey questions presented to the respondents. Specific questions, 
such as the ones related to backlogs, were excluded from scoring. This exclusion was required 
as no comparative dataset currently exists to asses a proper quantitative score value.  
The questions considered most relevant to the establishment of the digital forensic 
readiness score were Q2, Q3, Q8-Q10, Q12-Q16, and Q18-Q19. Their respective scored 
values can be seen in the following table (See Table 1).  
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Table 1. Digital Forensic Readiness Score Chart 
Digital Forensic Readiness Score Chart 
Question 
# 
Response 
(Weight) 
Response 
(Weight) 
Response 
(Weight) 
Response 
(Weight) 
Response 
(Weight) 
Response 
(Weight) 
Max 
Score 
2 Yes - (.23) No - (0) PNTA - (0)    .230 
3 Yes - (.05) No - (0) IDNK - (0)    .050 
8 Yes - (.05) No - (0) IDNK - (0)    .050 
9 Yes - (.01) No - (0) IDNK - (0)    .010 
10 1 - (.002) 2 - 3 - (.006) 4 - 5 - (.008) 6 or greater - 
(.01) 
IDNK - (0)  .010 
12 Very High - 
(.025) 
High - (.02) Medium - (.015) Low (.01) Very Low - 
(.005) 
PNTA -(0) .025 
13 Extremely 
Effective - 
(.025) 
Moderately 
Effective - 
(.02) 
Effective - (.015) Somewhat 
Effective - 
(.01) 
Not 
Effective - 
(.005) 
PNTA -(0) .025 
14 Very High - 
(.025) 
High - (.02) Medium - (.015) Low - (.01) Very Low - 
(.005) 
PNTA -(0) .025 
15 Very High - 
(.025) 
High - (.02) Medium - (.015) Low - (.01) Very Low - 
(.005) 
PNTA -(0) .025 
16 Yes - (.025) No - (0) Other - (Variable)    .025 
18 Very good - 
(.025) 
Good - (.02) Fair (.015) Poor - (.01) Very Poor - 
(.005) 
PNTA -(0) .025 
19 Yes - (0.50) No - (0) Other - (Variable)    .500 
Total 
Score 
      1.00 
Note. PNTA = “Prefer not to answer”; IDKN = “I do not know” 
 
Each question selected for scoring purposes pertained to key elements of readiness, as 
were identified during the literature review. Heavier weights were assigned to values relating 
to policy, people, and resources in that order. It was determined that these areas were the 
foundation of readiness (Dilijonaite, 2018; Elyas et al., 2015; Karie & Karume, 2017; 
Pangalos & Katos, 2009). Perception questions were considered and scored due to the nature 
of the study; however, it was determined that site visits and observations might have 
potentially yielded more accurate and useful results. Gauging perception also allowed for an 
inferential approach to be leveraged to determine the statistical differences relating to 
proximity relationships.   
Analysis of Backlogs 
Understanding backlogs in relation to digital forensic readiness was an important part 
of this research. In order to establish that relationship, data was collected by way of the survey 
instrument (See Appendix B). Questions twenty-one (Q21) and twenty-two (Q22) focused on 
the collection of data related to existing backlogs. These questions and response options can 
be seen in the following table (See Table 2).  
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Table 2. Digital Forensic Readiness Backlog Questions 
Digital Forensic Readiness Backlog Questions 
Question 
# 
Question Response Response Response Response Response Response 
21 Do you currently 
have a backlog of 
digital evidentiary 
items? 
Yes No I do not 
know 
   
22 What is the current 
number of cases 
backlogged as the 
result of digital 
evidence backlogs? 
1 2 - 5 6 - 10 10 - 15 15+ Other 
(please 
specify) 
Analysis of this data was conducted by first examining the population of the location 
in which the responding agency oversees. For agencies charged with overseeing institutions 
(i.e., schools), the populations of the institutions were considered in lieu of a census-based 
determination. The backlogs could then examined in relation to the population resulting in the 
possible establishment of an impact score. This impact score could then be used to satisfy 
HP2.  
Methodology Summary 
This chapter presented and defended the formal methodology for this research. The 
approach considered the problem as well as the many factors that could potentially influence 
the data. The previously validated survey instrument was reviewed, and additions were made 
to accommodate developments in the field and to answer the research questions related to this 
study. The formal collection method, including limitations, was presented along with a formal 
confidentiality and risk assessment. Following these assessments, the methods for data 
analysis were examined. The basis for the digital forensic readiness score was presented along 
with the approach to derive, analyze, and present the data. In addition, the method for 
analyzing data relating to backlogs was also presented. In Chapter 4, the data will be 
examined using the methodology and approach defined in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CASE STUDY (RESULTS AND DISCUSSION) 
This section contains a detailed analysis of the data and methods used for this study. 
As was noted in Chapter 3, a survey instrument (See Appendix B) in digital and paper form 
was used to collect the data. First, the population response rates are presented along with a 
reexamination of the pre and post-survey exclusionary criteria. This data will then be 
presented at the state level, examining such trends as the response by agency size, along with 
other high-level interpretations of the response data. The data will then be broken down 
further to analyze trends among various response categories that considered the research 
questions and stated hypotheses. County-level data will then be examined to provide a 
broader understanding of the consolidated statewide information. Finally, this chapter will be 
summarized. 
Population & Exclusion Data 
The total perceived population, as was detailed in Chapter 3, consisted of one-
hundred-eighty-three (183) agencies identified using publicly available resources. Forty-two 
(42) of these agencies were initially excluded for various reasons, including not meeting the 
definition of a law enforcement agency as defined for the purpose of this study. This left a 
total survey population of one-hundred-forty-one (141) agencies. This data is summarized in 
the table below (See Table 3). 
Table 3. Population Breakdown 
Population Breakdown 
Agency Count (Total) Agency Count (Excluded) Total Population 
182 42 141 
 
Of the inclusionary population, each would receive an electronic survey, a paper 
survey, or both. Additional exclusions would result as a by-product of issues relating to the 
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data collected (incomplete); however, this was found to be negligible considering the final 
response rate. It must be further noted that some agencies did not receive an electronic survey 
due to a lack of an identified email address or a bounced email. This data is provided in the 
table below (See Table 4). 
Table 4. Population Contact Counts by Method 
Population Contact Counts by Method 
Agency Count (Included) Email Survey Sent Paper Survey Sent 
141 118 141 
Note. Email addresses could not be located for twenty-three (23 agencies) 
The data noted above and the rationale used to determine exclusions are essential to 
understanding how the final dataset was built. In the next section, the response rates for both 
methods of contact will be presented. 
Response Rates 
Survey response rates for this study were underwhelming but were consistent with 
previous studies (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010). Of the paper surveys mailed, only 
twenty-seven (27) of the one-hundred-forty-one (141) were returned. Each of these responses 
would be added to the aggregated dataset. The response rates for the electronic surveys were 
lower. 
Of the one-hundred-eighteen (118) electronic surveys sent, only four (4) were 
completed by the respondents. Forty-one (41) or thirty-four-point-seven percent (34.7%) of 
the invitations were opened. Seventy-two invitations, or sixty-one percent (61%), were 
unopened. Four invitations, or three-point-four percent (3.4%), were bounced back. One 
respondent opted out.  
Ten respondents clicked through the survey. One of the four respondents that 
submitted a response was excluded due to an incomplete submission. An incomplete 
submission is one in which the user entered answers, but did not click the finish button at the 
end of the survey. This resulted in a total dataset that included thirty respondents. The 
response percentages, as noted above, are presented in the table below (See Table 5). 
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Table 5. Response Percentages  
Response Percentages 
Survey Type Total Sent Total Received Percentage 
Email Survey 118 3 2.5% 
Paper Survey 141 27 19% 
Total - 30 21% 
Note: The total value under the total sent column was not included in the calculations as they represent the same agency 
set. 
In regards to the population, it should be reiterated that the total population was one-
hundred forty-one (141). The twenty-one percent (21%) response rate was similar to Flory’s 
(2016) study, where a (9.9%) response rate was exhibited with a total sample size of two-
hundred sixty-three (263).   
State-Level Data (RQ1) 
The presentation of data at the state level is being provided to demonstrate statistical 
trends in a holistic fashion. First, an examination of responses relating to agency size will be 
examined. This data will be compared against the Flory (2016) study to identify any 
similarities. Second, a presentation and examination of the readiness scores will be provided 
along with relationships to perceived ability. Third, responses relating to training will be 
explored. Fourth, perceptions-based question data that considered prosecutorial ability, 
comprehension of judges and juries, resources, and emerging trends are presented.  
Agency Size Response Analysis (Q1) 
During this study, one-hundred-forty-one (141) agencies were identified as meeting 
the criteria of a law enforcement agency, as was defined in Chapter 3. As was previously 
noted, it is possible that other agencies do exist or that some of the agencies identified were 
sub-agencies or affiliates. For the purpose of this analysis, these possible deviations were not 
considered in the calculations presented in this section. The table below (See Table 6), as 
adapted from Flory (2016), represents the final number of responding agencies by agency 
size. 
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Table 6. Responses by Agency Size (Q1) 
Responses by Agency Size (Q1) 
Number of Sworn Officers Responses Percent of Total Responses 
0 - 5 5 17% 
6 - 10 2 7% 
11 - 20 5 17% 
21 - 50 6 20% 
51 - 75 3 10% 
76 - 100 3 10% 
101 - 150 3 10% 
151 - 250 0 0% 
251 - 500 1 3% 
500 + 2 7% 
Prefer not to answer 0 0% 
Totals 30 100% 
When compared to Flory’s (2016) study, the data is similar in that the largest response 
rates originated from agencies with a size between twenty-one and fifty sworn officers. The 
second-largest response rates were also similar; however, this study yielded a tie for second 
place between agencies of size zero to fifty and eleven to twenty. The table below presents 
both datasets for comparative purposes (See Table 7).  
Table 7. Responses by Agency Size - Maryland v. Indiana  
Responses by Agency Size - Maryland v. Indiana 
Number of Sword 
Officers 
Maryland 
Responses 
Indiana 
Responses 
Maryland Percent 
of Total Responses 
Indiana Percent of Total 
Responses  
0 - 5 5 1 17% 4% 
6 - 10 2 2 7% 8% 
11 - 20 5 6 17% 23% 
21 - 50 6 9 20% 35% 
51 - 75 3 2 10% 8% 
76 - 100 3 0 10% 0% 
101 - 150 3 4 10% 15% 
151 - 250 0 1 0% 4% 
251 - 500 1 1 3% 4% 
500 + 2 - 7% - 
Prefer not to 
answer 
0 - 0% - 
Totals 30 26 100% 101% 
Note: The population size for this study was 141, where the population size for Indiana (Flory, 2016) was 263. 
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It is of note that a data inconsistency was noted in the Flory (2016) study where the 
percentage distribution exceeds one-hundred percent. It was further noted that the data, as 
presented, does not delineate between agency sizes above two-hundred-fifty-one (251). The 
possible rationale behind these inconsistencies in response rates was considered outside the 
scope of this survey, but still of note. As such, no correlations or assumptions were made to 
determine the likelihood of an agency responding to this type of study. 
State Readiness Scores  
Research question one (RQ1) sought to determine the digital forensic readiness 
posture of law enforcement agencies in the state of Maryland. To accomplish this, weighted 
scores were assigned to many of the questions within the survey (See Chapter 3 - Data 
Forensic Readiness Score). The following sections present a comprehensive review of the 
data collected and the resulting scores. 
 Of the returned surveys, thirty were considered complete. It must be noted that 
compete for the purpose of scoring was that the respondent provided sufficient detail in their 
responses so that a score could be assigned. Twenty-four respondents required a manual 
review of their responses. The questions that triggered reviews were any combination of 
questions three, nine, ten, and sixteen. The analysis of each of these anomalies is presented in 
their respective sections.  
Expert on Staff (Q2) 
Question two (Q2) was presented to determine if the agency believed they had an 
expert in digital forensics on staff. The scoring weight was point-two-three (.23) for an 
affirmative answer and zero (0) for a response of No or Prefer not to answer. Twenty-nine 
respondents responded to question two (Q2). No anomalies were noted. The results are 
presented in the figure below (See Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Expert on Staff (Q2) 
 Twenty-nine respondents provided an answer to question two (Q2). One respondent 
did not provide an answer. No assumptions were made as to why the respondent did not 
include an answer, nor was it assumed a non-response should be considered an answer of 
prefer not to answer. For scoring purposes, the respondent that did not provide an answer was 
assigned a score of zero (0).  
Dedicated Expert on Staff (Q3) 
Question three (Q3) was presented to determine if the expert on staff was solely 
dedicated to the function of digital forensics with no other duties assigned. The scoring weight 
was point-zero-five (.05) for an affirmative answer and zero (0) for a response of No or Prefer 
not to answer. Nine respondents responded to question three (Q3). Two anomalies were 
detected. 
Twenty-one respondents did not provide a response to question three (Q3); however, it 
was found that these respondents did provide an answer on No to question two (Q2). Per the 
instructions, the respondent was to skip to question four (Q4) if providing a response of No to 
question three (Q2). Each of these respondents was assigned a score of zero for question three 
(Q3).  
Two respondents answered No for both questions two (Q2) and three (Q3). These 
responses were in error, as the respondents should have skipped to question four (Q4) based 
on their responses. As a result, the two responses were excluded from the counts for question 
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3 (Q3). It should be noted that the score for question three (Q3) was dependent on question 
two (Q4) and added a positive modifier for an affirmative response. The results, adjusted for 
the two response errors, are presented in the figure below (See Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Dedicated Expert on Staff (Q3) 
Based on the data collected for question three (Q3), around fifty-seven percent (57%) 
of agencies that employ a digital forensics expert has that individual employed in that sole 
capacity. For comparison, Flory (2016) reported ten agencies in Indiana having self-identified 
as having a digital forensics expert on staff. Of these, only three, thirty percent (30%) were 
solely dedicated to that task (Flory, 2016).  
Training Metrics (Q8 – Q11) 
This section examines questions eight (Q8) through question eleven (Q11). These 
questions gathered data to determine if agency employees had relevant certifications or 
degrees; were attending training; the number of training sessions attended; justifications or 
rationale for any lack of training. First, question number eight (Q8) will be presented, 
followed by the remaining questions.  
Training – Certification or Degree (Q8) 
Question eight was presented to determine if the responding agency had someone on 
staff that possessed a formal certification of degree related to digital forensics. The scoring 
weight was point-zero-five (.05) for an affirmative answer, and zero (0) for a response of No 
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or I do not know. All thirty respondents provided an answer to this question. The distribution 
of scores is presented in the figure below (See Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Digital Forensics – Certification or Degree (Q8) 
Training – Attendance (Q9) 
Twenty-nine responses were received for question number nine (Q9). The scoring 
weight was point-zero-five (.05) for an affirmative answer, and zero (0) for a response of No 
or I do not know. There was one anomaly noted withing the dataset for question nine (Q9), 
which is explained below. 
It was found that one respondent did not answer question nine (Q9), or question ten 
(Q10); however, they did properly answer question eleven (Q11). The response provided by 
this respondent for question eleven (Q11) was that there is no funding available for this type 
of training. It was decided that this response was sufficient to correct the dataset to reflect an 
answer of No for question nine as the respondent has indicated that no funding is available for 
training.  
This manual correction resulted in an N value of thirty for question nine (Q9). The 
statewide response totals and distributions for question nine (Q9) are provided in the figure 
below (See Figure 7).  
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Figure 7. Training – Within Past 5 Years (Q9) 
Forty-six percent (46%) of respondents reported that members of their organization 
did not attend any digital forensics training within the past five years. Forty percent (40%) of 
respondents reported that training(s) were attended within the past five years. A little under 
five percent (5%) reported, not knowing.  
Respondents that answered Yes to question nine (Q9) were instructed to continue to 
question ten (Q10). It is of note that the number of respondents reporting having attended 
training was less than that reported in Flory’s (2016) study. Flory’s (2016) study, which had 
an N of twenty-six, found that sixty-percent (60%) of agencies reported having someone 
within the agency that had attended training within the past five years. The rationale behind 
these responses for this study and the Flory (2016) are examined in question number eleven 
(Q11).  
Training – Number Attended (Q10) 
There was a total of fourteen responses to question number ten (Q10). The scoring 
weights were: point-zero-zero-two (.002) for a response of 1; point-zero-zero-six (.006) for a 
response of 2-3; point-zero-zero-eight (.008) for a response of 4-5; point-zero-one (.01) for a 
response of 6 or greater; and zero (0) for a response of I do not know. During an examination 
of the counts, it was found that there were two responses above the twelve affirmative 
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answers in question nine (Q9). This anomaly warranted investigation before analysis could 
begin.  
It was determined that one respondent had answered No to question nine (Q9) and 
provided an answer of (2-3) for question ten (Q10). A second respondent answered I do not 
know for question nine (Q9), and I do not know for question ten (Q10). Both of these 
responses were in error. The instructions stated that respondents were to move forward to 
question eleven (Q11) when responding No to question nine (Q9). Respondents answering I 
do know to question nine (Q9) were instructed to proceed to question twelve (Q12). As a 
result, both respondent’s answers to question ten (Q10) were disregarded for purposes of the 
count. Both respondents were assigned a score of zero for questions ten (Q10). No other 
anomalies were noted. The corrected totals can be found in the figure below (See Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Number of Training Attended -Within Past 5 Years (Q10) 
Having gathered these results, the next step was to determine if the number of 
trainings correlated in any way to the size of the reporting agency. This would be 
accomplished by examining the reported agency size against the reported number of trainings 
attended to identify patterns or relationships. It was anticipated that no causal relationships 
would exist. The consolidated data is presented in the table below (See Table 8). 
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Table 8. Agency Size to Training Attended (Comparison – Q1 / Q10)  
Agency Size to Training Attended (Comparison – Q1 / Q10) 
  
Agency Size  
0-5 6-10 11-20 21-50 51-75 76-100 101-150 151-250 251-500 500 + 
Prefer 
not to 
answer 
Totals 
N
um
be
r 
of
 T
ra
in
in
gs
 1 
    1       1 
2 - 3   1 1  2 2     6 
4 - 5          1  1 
6 or 
greater 
      1   1  2 
I do 
not 
know 
   2        2 
 Totals   1 3 1 2 3   2  12 
Half of the agencies, fifty percent (50%), reported that between two and three trainings 
had been attended. Of the two agencies reporting six or greater, one had a reported agency 
size of five hundred plus (500+) and the other one-hundred-one (101) to one-hundred-fifty 
(150). Based on the pattern of distribution, no significant correlation could be found that links 
the agency size to the number of trainings. 
Training – Lack of Training (Q11) 
Question number eleven (Q11) was presented to determine the rationale, if any, for 
those agencies that had responded No to question nine (Q9). No scoring weight was assigned 
to this question. Of the fifteen responses, three anomalies were noted.  
One respondent responded in the affirmative to question nine (Q9), and per the 
instructions should have skipped questions ten (Q10) and eleven (Q11). As a result, this 
respondent’s answer for question eleven (Q11) was disregarded for purposes of the count. For 
the second anomaly, a respondent answered question eleven (Q11) by providing two 
responses. While this was not an anticipated action, the data was found useful and was 
included. The third anomaly noted was a respondent that answered NO to question nine, but 
did not provide an answer to question eleven (Q11).  
To clarify, thirteen respondents properly responded to question eleven (Q11). One 
respondent did not provide an answer. One respondent provided two responses. The statewide 
response totals and distributions for question eleven (Q11) are provided in the figure below 
(See Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Number of Training Attended -Within Past 5 Years (Q11) 
Of the responses, two respondents provided a written response. These responses were: 
1. “These duties are performed by a county police agency.” 
2. “STATE POLICE handle all programs.” 
The number of agencies that have employees that have attended training and those that 
did not were quite similar. For those agencies that did not have employees that had attended 
training, the results suggested some of the principal driving factors were a lack of need or a 
lack of funding. It was interesting to note that forty-three percent (43%) of the responses 
indicated that training in the subject matter area is not needed.  
In that regard, the results were very similar to Flory’s (2016) findings. When these 
specific responses are compared in relation to the agency size, a general theme could not be 
immediately identified. This data is provided in the figure below for reference (See Figure 
10).  
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Figure 10. Agency Size to Training Not Needed Response (Comparison Q1 / Q11) 
Distribution appears random; however, it was interesting that no agencies with a size 
above one-hundred (100+) reported this as a response. This could possibly suggest, with 
support of one of the provided written responses, that larger agencies may be consuming the 
work, thus from the respondent’s perspective negating the need for this type of training.  
Perceptions (Q12 – Q16 & Q18) 
The following sections examine questions twelve (Q12) through question sixteen 
(Q16) and question 18 (Q18). These questions gathered data to determine agency perceptions 
on various topics. These topics included perceived investigative ability, the ability of local 
prosecuting attorneys, the ability of local judges, the ability of local juries, perceived 
resources, and perceived ability of staff.  
Perceived Ability – Investigative (Q12) 
Question twelve (Q12) was presented in order to solicit each agency’s self-reported 
perceived ability to effectively investigate a case involving digital evidence. The scoring 
weights were: point-zero-two-five (.025) for a response of Very High; point-zero-two (.02) for 
a response of  High; point-zero-one-five ( .015) for a response of Medium; point-zero-one 
(.01) for a response of Low; point-zero-zero-five (.005) for a response of Very Low; and zero 
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(0) for a response of Prefer not to answer. Thirty respondents provided answers to this 
question (Q12). The results are presented in the figure below (See Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. Perceived Investigative Ability (Comparison Q12) 
To better understand the relevance of these values, it must be examined in the context 
of the associated digital forensic readiness scores. Based on the nature of the question, one 
could speculate that the average values of corresponding digital forensic readiness scores, as 
spread across the categories, would decrease. Average values that did not decrease moving 
down the spectrum would warrant further investigation and could be an indicator of either 
errors, bias, or a misinterpretation of the question (Q12).  
In this study, the average values did, in fact, decrease as expected. The sorted scores 
and averages are presented in the table below (See Table 9) 
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Table 9. Perceived Ability to Readiness Scores (Q12)  
Perceived Ability to Readiness Scores (Q12) 
  
Very 
High High Medium Low 
Very 
Low 
Prefer Not to 
Answer 
R
ea
di
ne
ss
 S
co
re
s 
0.998 0.955 0.867 0.77 0.06 0.55 
0.915 0.685 0.64 0.57 0.075 0.545 
0.63 0.33 0.585 0.525 0.065 0.51 
  0.08 0.58 0.065 0.055   
    0.58 0.05     
    0.575 0.045     
    0.38 0.04     
    0.165       
    0.12       
Average 0.847667 0.5125 0.499111 0.295 0.06375 0.535 
Highest 0.998 0.955 0.867 0.77 0.06 0.55 
Lowest 0.63 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.055 0.51 
While the findings were rather consistent, one anomaly was noted in the High 
category with the lowest score coming in at point-zero-eight (.08). A review of this 
respondent’s data revealed that while the agency ranked their ability as high, their other 
responses noted a total dependence on outside assistance from “a combined investigative 
unit.” Since this is a perception-based question, there may be other influential factors. These 
factors fall outside the scope of this study. This particular respondent’s score was not 
modified or excluded; however, this does suggest clarity may be warranted in future iterations 
using this same survey instrument. Furthermore, it was noted that the value assigned to this 
question and its categories are likely appropriate as the modifier had little impact over the 
total score.   
Perceived Ability – Prosecution (Q13) 
Question thirteen (Q13) was presented in order to solicit each agency’s perceived 
ability of their “local prosecuting attorney’s office to present digital evidence at a hearing or a 
trial” (Flory, 2016). The scoring weights were: point-zero-two-five (.025) for a response of 
Extremely Effective; point-zero-two (.02) for a response of Moderately Effective; point-zero-
one-five (.015) for a response of Effective (.015); point-zero-one (.01) for a response of 
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Somewhat Effective (.01); point-zero-zero-five (.005) for a response of Not Effective (.005); 
and zero (0) for a response of Prefer not to answer (0). Thirty respondents provided a 
response to this question. No anomalies were noted. The results are presented in the figure 
below (See Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12. Perceived Ability – Prosecution (Q13) 
Based on Flory’s (2016) study, the perceptions of local prosecuting attorney’s offices 
are higher in Maryland. Flory (2016) reported that fifty-four percent (54%) rated their 
prosecuting attorney’s offices as “least effective.” This was interesting and may warrant 
further investigation. 
Perceived Ability – Local Judges (Q14) 
Question fourteen (Q14) was presented in order to solicit each agency’s perceived 
ability of their “local judges to understand digital evidence and its admissibility at trial” 
(Flory, 2016). effectively investigate a case involving digital evidence. The scoring weights 
were: point-zero-two-five (.025) for a response of Very High; point-zero-two (.02) for a 
response of High; point-zero-one-five (.015) for a response of Medium; point-zero-one (.01) 
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for a response of Low; point-zero-zero-five (.005) for a response of Very Low; and zero (0) for 
a response of Prefer not to answer (0). Thirty respondents provided a response to this 
question. No anomalies were noted. The results are presented in the figure below (See Figure 
13).  
 
Figure 13. Perceived Ability – Local Judges (Q14) 
As can be seen, about seventy-seven percent (77%) of respondents ranked their local 
judges’ ability at medium or higher. While concerning, since this is a perception-based 
question, the locality of the agency that provided an answer of very-low should be examined 
for possible systemic issues.  
Perceived Ability – Juries (Q15) 
Question fifteen (Q15) was presented in order to solicit each agency’s perceived 
ability of their “local juries to understand digital evidence when it is presented at trial” (Flory, 
2016). The scoring weights were: point-zero-two-five (.025) for a response of Very High; 
point-zero-two (.02) for a response of High; point-zero-one-five (.015) for a response of 
Medium; point-zero-one (.01) for a response of Low; point-zero-zero-five (.005) for a 
77 
response of Very Low; and zero (0) for a response of Prefer not to answer. Thirty respondents 
provided a response to this question. No anomalies were noted. The results are presented in 
the figure below (See Figure 14).  
 
Figure 14. Perceived Ability – Local Juries (Q15) 
 Forty-percent (40%) ranked their local juries’ ability as medium. Overall, without 
consideration for the responses of prefer not to answer, agencies tended to rank their local 
juries’ ability less favorably than that of their local prosecuting attorney’s offices or local 
judges. While outside the scope of this research, this raises the question of why? One way to 
examine this would be to explore the conviction rates and or case outcomes where digital 
evidence was presented at trial.  
Perceived – Resources (Q16) 
Question sixteen (Q16) was presented to determine if the agency believed they have 
“adequate resources to effectively conduct an investigation of a crime involving digital 
evidence” (Flory, 2016). The scoring weight was point-zero-five (.05) for an affirmative 
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answer, and zero (0) for a response of No or I do not know. Thirty respondents provided a 
response to this question (Q16). Several anomalies were noted.  
Five respondents required manual review for question number sixteen (Q16). Each of 
these respondents provided a response of other and provided a comment. These responses are 
included below: 
1. “[N]ot primary law enforcement in our county, other agency handles criminal 
investigations. Our agency would defer to primary agency.” 
2. “Training and experience - yes. Manpower - NO. Our forensic expert splits his time 
between digital forensic and general investigations.” 
3. “Yes, we rely on local sheriff's office for in depth investigations.” 
4. “Do not need an expert” 
5. “With assistance from a partner agency” 
These responses suggested that the essence of the question (Q16) may not have been 
clear. The intent of question (Q16) was to determine internal resources and capabilities 
without considering outside resources. After careful consideration of the responses, it was 
determined that none of the responses satisfied the criteria. As such, each was assigned a 
scoring value of zero (0) for this score modifier. The distribution of answers is presented in 
the figure below (See Figure 15).  
 
Figure 15. Perceived – Adequate Resources (Q16) 
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About fifty-four percent (54%) responded with an answer of No. If the responses of 
other are considered as a response of No, then the percentage value jumps to seventy percent 
(70%). This is very high and strongly puts into question each agency's ability to support cases 
involving digital evidence. 
Perceived Ability - Staff (Q18) 
Question eighteen (Q18) was presented in order to solicit each agency’s perceived 
ability of its staff to identify, collect, and preserve digital evidence. The scoring weights were: 
point-zero-two-five (.025) for a response of Very Good; point-zero-two (.02) for a response of 
Good; point-zero-one-five (.015) for a response of Fair; point-zero-one (.01) for a response of 
Poor; point-zero-zero-five (.005) for a response of Very Poor; and zero (0) for a response of 
Prefer not to answer. Thirty respondents provided a response to this question. No anomalies 
were noted. The results are presented in the figure below (See Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16. Perceived Ability – Staff (Q18) 
About seventy-seven percent (77%) ranked their staff at medium or higher. This was 
in line with Flory’s (2016) study in Indiana, where sixty-two percent (62%) of agencies 
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ranked their ability at medium or higher. This finding suggests that there may be self-ranking 
bias. To solicit more useful data, this question would likely have benefited from a revision or 
excluded for scoring.  
Standard Operating Procedure (Q19) 
Question nineteen (Q19) was presented to determine if the agency had a “defined 
standard operating procedure regarding the identification, preservation, and collection of 
digital evidence” (Flory, 2016). The scoring weight was point-five (.5) for an affirmative 
answer, and zero (0) for a response of No, and a variable amount for a response of other. 
Thirty respondents provided a response to this question. No anomalies were noted. The results 
are presented in the figure below (See Figure 17).  
 
Figure 17. Standard Operating Procedure (Q19) 
About fifty-seven percent (57%) of respondents indicated they have a standard 
operating procedure in place. This speaks directly to the readiness of an agency as policy and 
procedure are the foundation of the digital forensic process. Policy sharing may assist 
agencies in increasing the affirmative counts and, in turn, significantly increase the readiness 
scores across the state. This was considered a significant finding during this study, and future 
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research should be geared towards finding a method to increase the likelihood of policy 
sharing.  
Cloud\IoT (Q20) 
Question twenty (Q20) was presented to determine if the agency had concerns about 
its “ability to collect digital evidence from the cloud or the internet of things” (Flory, 2016). A 
scoring weight was not assigned for this topic as research is still ongoing to determine how to 
best address this topic within the community. There were thirty responses to this question. 
One respondent provided a written response, which was reviewed. No anomalies were 
detected. This data can be found in the figure below (See Figure 18).  
 
Figure 18. Cloud & IoT Concerns (Q20) 
The responses to this question (Q20) are a good indicator of how law enforcement is 
keeping pace with advancements in technology. To add additional value to the body of 
knowledge, this data is being presented in conjunction with the agency sizes (See Figure 18). 
It was interesting to note that four of the five agencies reporting of size zero to five (0 – 5) 
were not concerned with these issues. Based on the data, agencies of size twenty-one to fifty 
(21 – 50) exhibited the most concern. For the two largest agencies, concerns were split. While 
outside the scope of this research, future research should determine why these differences 
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exist and ways to increase each agencies ability to deal with emerging technologies. The data 
provides a baseline to narrow the scope of such an effort.  
Section Summary (RQ1) 
After careful review of all relevant questions, each respondent’s digital forensic 
readiness score was calculated. The following table represents each respondent and their 
corresponding digital forensic readiness scores (See Table 10). 
 Table 10. Digital Forensic Readiness Scores  
Digital Forensic Readiness Scores 
(N=30) 
0.998 0.685 0.58 0.525 0.12 0.06 
0.955 0.64 0.575 0.51 0.08 0.055 
0.915 0.63 0.57 0.38 0.075 0.05 
0.867 0.585 0.55 0.33 0.065 0.045 
0.77 0.58 0.545 0.165 0.065 0.04 
The scores, as presented in Table 10, are sorted from highest to lowest. It was found 
that the average for these scores is point-four-three-three-six (.4336) with a median value of 
point-five-three-five (.535). About fifty-seven percent (57%) were assigned a score greater 
than point-five (.5). With this study being the first of its kind, data does not currently exist for 
comparative purposes. The data presented here is being provided here for context and as a 
baseline for possible future research.  
Proximity Relationships (RQ2 & HP1) 
Research question two (RQ2) sought to determine if an agency’s proximity to or 
availably of external resources influence its internal digital forensics posture. It was initially 
hypothesized (HP1) that law enforcement agencies within the state of Maryland that are 
within a twenty-mile radius of the two primary central hubs, Baltimore, MD, and Washington 
D.C., will exhibit a more mature digital forensic readiness posture. This was found not to be 
true. This section presents the results and findings. 
For this analysis, twenty-six of the thirty respondents were considered and included in 
the dataset. Four of the thirty respondents had removed the page that contained the agency’s 
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unique identification code (UIC). The removal of this page made it impossible to determine 
the originating agency. Since the location of the agency was critical for this portion of the 
analysis and plotting purposes, these four respondents were excluded. Having identified the 
exclusions, it was necessary to then identify agencies that fell within the twenty-mile radius of 
the two hubs. The radial map, created using Google Earth, used for this analysis is presented 
below (See Figure 19).  
 
Figure 19. Proximity Map of Maryland (Datas SIO et al., 2018) 
It was found that three agencies fell within the twenty-mile radius of Baltimore, MD. 
The scores from these agencies ranged from point-nine-nine-eight (.998) to point zero-seven-
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five (.075). The distribution of the twenty-six respondents by distance from Baltimore, MD, is 
presented in the figure below (See Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20. Proximity – Baltimore, MD 
As can be seen, there is no discernable relationship between the digital forensic 
readiness scores and the distance to Baltimore, MD. Despite this, it is interesting to note that 
the agency with the highest score of the twenty-six agencies examined did fall within a 
twenty-mile radius to Baltimore, MD. Similar results were seen when examining the dataset 
in relation to Washington, DC. This data can be found in the figure below (See Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21. Proximity – Washington, D.C. 
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It was found that six agencies fell within the twenty-mile radius of Washington, DC. 
The scores for these agencies ranged from point-nine-one-five (.915) to point-zero-four-five 
(.045). The agency with the third-highest score, point-nine-one-five (.915), fell within the 
twenty-mile radius of Washington, DC. Again, no visible relationship can be identified. Next, 
we examine both sets combined. This data is presented in the figure below (See Figure 22).  
 
 
Figure 22. Proximity – Washington, D.C. & Baltimore, MD 
Of the twenty-six agencies, none fell within the intersection point of the two hubs. 
Based on the data as gathered and presented, it can be stated that no proximity relationship 
exists. What this does seem to suggest is that agencies appear to operate independently and in 
a localized fashion.  
Analysis of Backlogs (RQ3) 
Research question three (RQ3) sought to determine if an agency's internal digital 
forensic readiness posture had an impact on the number of internal backlogs of digital 
forensic evidence. It was hypothesized (HP2) that all agencies, regardless of their distance 
between the hubs, will exhibit similar digital evidence backlogs when viewed in relation to 
the populations of the county or municipality in which the agency is located. To gather data to 
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examine these issues, two questions (Q21 & Q22) were added to the original survey 
instrument. Each question and the results will now be examined.  
Existing Backlogs (Q21) 
 Question twenty-one (Q21) specifically sought to solicit a backlog status. No score 
weight was assigned to the response. Thirty respondents responded to question twenty-one 
(Q21). No anomalies were encountered for question twenty-one (Q21). The data gathered can 
be found in the figure below (See Figure 23). 
 
Figure 23. Existing Backlogs 
About seventy-seven percent (77%) of the respondents indicated that no backlog 
existed at the time the survey was taken. This figure was surprising but could be a good 
indicator that agencies have processes in place to prevent backlogs. Based on the results of 
question five (Q5), it was noted that this might be the result of case outsourcing. The results 
from question five (Q5) are presented below for considerations (See Figure 24). 
 
Figure 24. Outside Assistance Sought (Q5) 
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It was found that twenty-nine respondents provided an answer to question five (Q5). 
No scoring weight was assigned to this question (Q5). It was noted that about fifty-two 
percent (52%) of the respondents sought outside assistance to process digital forensic 
evidence. In future research, this data could be cross-correlated to determine the significance, 
if any, of outsourcing in regards to backlogs. Having reviewed this data, it was then possible 
to analyze the data gathered for question twenty-two (Q22). 
Backlog Counts (Q22) 
Question twenty-two (Q22) sought to identify the number of cases backlogged for 
those answering in the affirmative to question twenty-one (Q21). No score weight was 
assigned to the response. Ten respondents provided responses to question twenty-two (Q22). 
Several anomalies were detected. These anomalies will now be presented. 
It was found that five of the respondents that had answered No to question twenty-one 
(Q21) had provided an answer of other for question twenty-two (Q22). These answers were in 
error. After a manual review of these answers, it was determined that the values were either 
reported as zero (0) or provided other details not relevant to the question. As a result, these 
counts were subsequently excluded from the analysis of question twenty-two (Q22). In 
addition, one respondent answered I do not know to question twenty-one (Q21), but supplied a 
response of two to three (2-3) for question twenty-two (Q22). This response was also 
excluded. The corrected results for question twenty-two (Q22) are presented in the figure 
below (See Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25. Backlog Counts (Q22) 
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Section Summary 
It was found that four of the twenty-nine agencies reported having backlogs. Two of 
these agencies had backlogs of fifteen or more (15+). With the data gathered from question 
twenty-one (Q21) and question twenty-two (Q22), it would then be possible to perform a 
relational analysis of the data. This analysis is presented in the next section (See Backlogs – 
Relational Analysis). 
Backlogs – Relational Analysis (HP2) 
This section is being presented to examine any potential relationship between an 
agency’s digital forensic readiness score and their backlogs. To accomplish this, digital 
forensic readiness scores of the four agencies that self-reported as having backlogs were 
compared. It was found that three of these agencies had digital forensic readiness scores that 
fell within the top five scores.  
This was rather surprising; however, when examining comments from other 
respondents, it was noted that many agencies were deferring to partners and/or more equipped 
agencies. If this data is taken at face value, one could infer that a higher digital forensic 
readiness score would result in higher backlogs. Considering the limited dataset, it is not 
possible to determine any specific impact of readiness over backlogs. The table below 
contains the data considered during this analysis (See Table 11).  
Table 11. Digital Forensic Readiness Scores / Backlogged Cases (Comparison) 
Digital Forensic Readiness Score / Backlogged Cases (Comparison) 
Backlogged Cases (#) Scores Count(s) 
1 0 0 
2-5 (.867) 1 
6-10 0 0 
10-15 (.38) 1 
15+ (.998), (.915) 2 
Other 0 0 
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Backlogs / Distance Analysis  
Hypothesis number two (HP2) stated that all agencies, regardless of their distance 
between the hubs, will exhibit similar digital evidence backlogs when viewed in relation to 
the populations of the county or municipality in which the agency is located. Again, the 
dataset was insufficient to support the hypothesis; however, the data is being presented here 
for consideration and as a potential baseline for future research (See Table 12).  
Table 12. Backlog Distance Table  
Backlog Distance Table 
Counties 
Reporting 
Backlogs 
Population 
(2010\yr.) 
Backlog 
Count 
DFR 
Score 
Distance – 
Baltimore, MD 
(mi) 
Distance – 
Washington, D.C.  
(mi) 
Anne Arundel 537,656 15+ 0.998 13.6 25.6 
Caroline 33,066 2-5 0.867 50.7 65.2 
Montgomery 971,777 15+ 0.915 35.7 17.6 
Washington 147,430 10-15 0.38 64.3 62.6 
Note: Population estimates provided by the state of Maryland (Maryland, n.d.) 
As can be seen, no correlation is apparent. From this particular dataset, it could be 
stated that agencies with an agency size of five-hundred (500) or greater are more likely to 
exhibit a backlog of cases of fifteen (15) or greater; however, this would be premature. 
Additional data needs to be gathered for comparative purposes. At the time of this research, a 
consolidated source for backlog data could not be located. Articles, such as the one by Watt’s 
(2017), elude to backlogs, but this is not sufficient evidence to reach a scientific conclusion.  
County-Level Data 
This section contains a summary of county-level data. Due to the sensitive nature of 
some of the perception-based responses, steps have been taken to obfuscate the individual 
responding agencies. First, the number of agencies that responded by county will be presented 
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along with count distributions and a statewide percentage ranking. Digital forensic readiness 
scores by county will then be presented. Finally, this data will be summarized. 
Agencies from fourteen counties and one municipality responded. One response 
packet was received from an agency in Baltimore County, but this response was found to be 
incomplete and excluded from the count. This brought the total county inclusion count to 
thirteen and one municipality. The graphical representation of these results can be seen in the 
figure below (See Figure 26).  
 
Figure 26. Responding Counties (Q22) 
 The counties highlighted in yellow in Figure 24 reflect counties where a response 
packet originated. Four additional responses were received; however, the unique identifier 
code had been removed from the returned survey. This made it impossible to determine the 
originating agency. The following table contains the response counts by county along with 
their percentage rank (See Table 13).  
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Table 13. County Counts  
County Counts 
County Respondent Pool Responded Percentage 
Response 
Rank (%) 
Unknown - 4 - - 
Allegany 6 1 16.67% 8 
Anne Arundel 8 5 62.50% 1 
Baltimore City 13 1 7.69% 11 
Baltimore 
County 6 1 16.67% 8 
Calvert 1 0 0.00% - 
Caroline 5 1 20.00% 7 
Carroll 7 1 14.29% 9 
Cecil 6 2 33.33% 4 
Charles 2 0 0.00% - 
Dorchester 3 0 0.00% - 
Fredrick 4 0 0.00% - 
Garrett 2 0 0.00% - 
Harford 4 0 0.00% - 
Howard 3 0 0.00% - 
Kent 3 1 33.33% 4 
Montgomery 7 2 28.57% 5 
Prince George's 29 4 13.79% 10 
Queen Anne's 2 0 0.00% - 
Saint Mary 2 1 50.00% 3 
Somerset 4 1 25.00% 6 
Talbot 5 0 0.00%  
Washington 7 4 57.14% 2 
Wicomico 5 1 20.00% 7 
Worcester 7 1 14.29% 9 
 Totals 141 30 21.28%  
Each of the digital forensic readiness scores was presented at the state level in a 
previous section. This section now presents them at the county level. The following table 
contains the distribution of the digital forensic readiness scores by county (See Table 14). 
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Table 14. County-Level – DFR Scores 
County-Level - DFR Scores 
County Scores 
Unknown (.065), (.05), (.58), (.57) 
Allegany (.33) 
Anne Arundel (.06), (.075), (.998), (.55), (.04) 
Baltimore City (.77) 
Caroline (.867) 
Carroll (.525) 
Cecil (.165), (.51) 
Kent (.585) 
Montgomery (.915), (.63) 
Prince George's (.065), (.575), (.045), (.12) 
Saint Mary (.64) 
Somerset (.58) 
Washington (.955), (.545), (.38), (.055) 
Wicomico (.685) 
Worcester (.08) 
Section Summary 
This section focused on the data at the county level. To preserve the confidentiality of 
the agencies' responses, steps were taken to obfuscate the identity of each agency. The data 
presented here provide a working baseline for possible future research. For example, it may 
now be possible to measure and examine response rates within the state moving forward. This 
includes devising ways to increase the response rates, which was found to be problematic 
during this study. 
Case Study Summary 
This chapter presented the data gathered during this research. This data was analyzed 
in order to address the three research questions as well as to support or refute the hypotheses. 
The results were somewhat surprising. These results will not be summarized. 
 During a state-level analysis of the data, research question one (RQ1) was satisfied 
through the establishment of a digital forensic readiness score for each responding agency. It 
was found that around fifty-seven percent (57%) had digital forensic readiness scores greater 
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than point-five (.5). With the establishment of the digital forensic readiness scores, it was then 
possible to examine research question two (RQ2) 
Research question two (RQ2), along with hypothesis one (HP1), was realized by 
mapping each agency’s distance from the central hubs and examining the variations in 
relation to the assigned digital forensic readiness scores. It was found that no statistically 
significant trends exist to support hypothesis one (HP1). Furthermore, based on the data 
collected, it was determined that an agency's distance between the two hubs in this study did 
not influence the digital forensic readiness scores. After this analysis, data were examined to 
answer research question three (RQ3).  
Research question three (RQ3), along with hypothesis two (HP2), was then examined 
using the collected datasets. Due to a low response rate, it was not possible to determine any 
significance between the digital forensic readiness scores and existing backlogs. In fact, it was 
noted that the data seemed to suggest that agencies with higher scores may be more likely to 
have backlogged cases. It was noted that several agencies provided responses that suggested a 
dependency on larger agencies, which could explain this. Like hypothesis one (HP1), there 
was not enough data to support hypothesis two (HP2).  
Consistent with previous studies (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010), the trend of 
low response rates from law enforcement agencies supporting this type of research made it 
difficult to establish any relationships of significant value. The data should not be discounted, 
though. This data, along with this research, fills a current gap that could be used to further 
examine Maryland, other states, or the entire region.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter (CH5) has been prepared to provide the reader with a summarized 
version of the work detailed in Chapters one (CH1) through Chapter four (CH4). First, the 
significance and purpose of this research will be presented. The methods used to pursue this 
work will then be detailed. Significant findings will then be examined. This will be followed 
by the study's limitations and issues encountered. The direction of future work related to this 
research will also be covered. Finally, this chapter (CH5) will be summarized along with a 
final summation of the work in its entirety. 
Significance of the Research  
This research is significant to the field as there has been a noted lack of this type of 
localized data collected within the United States (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010; 
Harichandran et al., 2016). This type of data, along with this type of analysis is necessary for 
identifying factors that may influence digital forensic readiness within the law enforcement 
community both locally and at large. These factors can then be used to derive metrics and 
establish baselines with the goal of decreasing digital evidentiary backlogs and increasing the 
chances of digital evidence being successfully used at trial. Furthermore, the data collected 
during this study, along with the establishment of digital forensic readiness scores, set the 
stage for comparative purposes that may assist in the standardization of the field.  
As of February 8th, 2020, no study of this magnitude, exploring these concepts, has 
been performed using law enforcement agencies in the state of Maryland as the population. In 
fact, very few studies like this have been performed nationwide (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & 
Jones, 2010; Harichandran et al., 2016). The lack of research in this area has led to 
speculative prescriptions for localized problems that are not fully understood (Flory, 2016; 
Harichandran et al., 2016; Lillis et al., 2016).  
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During this study, it was found that several findings were very similar in nature to the 
study conducted by Flory (2016). This was interesting, as Indiana’s demographics do not 
necessarily mirror those of Maryland. For example, the state of Indiana is larger in terms of 
both landmass and population (United States Census Bureau, 2010a, 2018a). In addition, it 
was also found that Indiana has more law enforcement agencies than Maryland (Flory, 2016). 
This suggested that factors such as population or resource availability may not be the primary 
drivers in the issues noted among the law enforcement community concerning the field of 
digital forensics.  
With commonalities, like the ones explored in this study (See Chapter 4), trends began 
to emerge. It could be reasonably concluded based on this research and previous research, that 
commonality does indeed exist. The commonality of an issue can act as a precursor to change 
when proper solutions are devised and implemented. While this study never set out to incite 
specific change, it is believed that the results identified can provide a window for change.  
Technology, however, is rapidly evolving, and with that evolution comes a haze that 
can cloud or muddy present findings. In order to help avoid cases like the one noted by Watts 
(2017), it is imperative to flood the body of knowledge with as much relevant and structured 
data as possible. This research accomplished this by providing data that can affect change if 
acted on in a timely manner.   
Methods 
This research was carefully planned and executed to ensure maximum coverage of the 
state and the topics considered. Previous research, specifically the studies by Flory (2016) and 
Gogolin and Jones (2010), provided a working model and baseline. To expand on the current 
body of knowledge in the most effective way possible, it was decided to use Flory’s (2016) 
pre-validated survey instrument. This approach provided a method of validation and 
transformation. To ensure new knowledge would be gained, additional questions were added 
that explored previously unexplored areas. These new areas of exploration included the 
examination of readiness, proximity relationships, and backlogs. To focus this effort three 
research questions and two hypotheses were created. The research questions and hypothesis 
are as follows: 
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RQ1. What is the current digital forensic readiness posture of law enforcement 
agencies in the state of Maryland?  
RQ2. Does an agency's proximity to or availably of external resources influence its 
internal digital forensics posture?  
RQ3. What impact, if any, does an agency's internal digital forensic readiness posture 
have over any internal backlogs of digital forensics evidence? 
The study also sought to support the following hypotheses:  
HP1. Law enforcement agencies within the state of Maryland that are within a twenty-
mile radius of the two primary central hubs, Baltimore, MD, and Washington D.C., 
will exhibit a more mature digital forensic readiness posture.  
HP2. It is hypothesized that all agencies, regardless of their distance between the hubs, 
will exhibit similar digital evidence backlogs when viewed in relation to the 
populations of the county or municipality in which the agency is located. 
The population, as was previously described (See Chapter 3), consisted solely of law 
enforcement agencies in the state of Maryland. Care was taken using freely available 
resources (Department of Public Saftey & Correctional Services, n.d.) to attempt to not only 
identify all agencies in the state but also to determine if the agencies indeed met the criteria of 
a law enforcement agency. Further vetting was performed to determine if agencies were sub-
agencies or affiliates in order to avoid the duplication of data. This process resulted in a 
population of one-hundred-forty-one (141) agencies.  
To contact these agencies, it was decided to utilize both a traditional mailed survey 
and an electronic survey. Respondents were afforded the opportunity to respond using either 
method. Of the one-hundred-forty-one (141) agencies, only thirty complete responses would 
be received. Twenty-seven responses would be received in paper form, and four would be 
received with the electronic collection method. One of the electronic responses was found to 
be incomplete and was excluded from the final dataset.  
To ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the process, the researcher carefully 
devised a data security plan, which included using encryption and air-gaped machines. This 
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process was reviewed and approved by the Dakota State University Institutional Review 
Board (DSU-IRB). To further enhance security and to promote trust in the process, the 
respondents were advised that county-level data would be obfuscated to protect the identity of 
each agency. The promotion of this trust is critical if future research is to be conducted.  
Findings 
As was noted in the previous section, this research was guided by three research 
questions and two hypotheses. These questions and hypotheses will be presented in order, 
along with the key findings from the research.   
Research Question One (RQ1) 
RQ1. What is the current digital forensic readiness posture of law enforcement 
agencies in the state of Maryland?  
During the inception of this study, a scoring system was created that assigned a 
numeric value to specific questions contained in the survey. These questions addressed areas 
relevant to the concept of digital forensic readiness, as was noted in several significant works 
(Elyas et al., 2015; Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010; Harichandran et al., 2016). The 
totality of these scores would be referred to as the agency’s digital forensic readiness score. 
Higher values would, in theory, represent a more mature state of digital forensic readiness.  
Due to the subjective nature of some of the questions, it should be noted that it is 
possible that the responses reflected in the surveys may not always align with the agency or 
locality's true state. In other words, some questions introduce the possibility of self-reporting 
bias skewing the results either higher or lower. With no comparative dataset, it was decided to 
state the possibility of bias and explore the issue in future iterations.  
To satisfy research question one (RQ1), scores would be tallied for each agency. 
Several anomalies were noted (See Chapter 4); however, careful review allowed for many of 
these anomalies to be resolved. It was found that several of the respondents either skipped 
questions or did not properly follow the instructions. In cases such as these, previous answers 
were explored to determine if sufficient details existed to correct the results. If it were not 
possible to determine the result, the response would be excluded from the dataset. For 
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questions with weighted scores where the data could not be determined, the respondent would 
be assigned a value of zero for that particular question.  
After each question was reviewed, the results were calculated (See Table 10). It was 
found that the average digital forensic readiness score was point-three-three-six (.4336) with a 
median score of point-five-three-five (.535). As was previously noted, this study was the first 
of its kind conducted within the state. As such, the scoring system and its accuracy have yet to 
be proven.  
A comprehensive needs-based analysis of these results would likely provide a method 
to increase scores; however, this was considered outside the scope of this study. It should be 
noted, though, that Flory (2016), using a needs-based approach, identified several areas of 
need in Indiana that could cross-correlate to the findings in Maryland. For example, 
addressing these areas of need, such as having a defined standard operating procedure, would 
significantly increase scores and overall readiness. With that in mind, these metrics and this 
data could be used as a baseline in order to establish acceptable scores at the national, state, or 
county levels.  
Enforcement of a set of minimum standards across the board, as derived from a needs-
based analysis, could increase the effectiveness of each agency in regards to digital forensic 
readiness. This is purely speculative, though, as these findings, and findings of other 
researches, have yet to be fully tested in a controlled and localized way. The data gathered 
from this study now establishes a baseline, which, if acted on, provide a means to substantiate 
this claim by way of future iterations.  
Future iterations of this study would likely yield fluctuations in the digital forensic 
readiness scores presented (See Chapter 4). The goal of these iterations would be to work 
towards a way to sustain or increase current scores. Based on this research, it is likely that this 
would prove challenging as agencies may find it difficult to keep pace with the increases in 
the levels, prevalence, and sophistication of cybercrime (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2019; Vincze, 2016). In addition, there may be a trend towards the outsourcing of digital 
forensics cases (See Chapter 4). 
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Research Question Two (RQ2) & Hypothesis One (HP1) 
RQ2. Does an agency's proximity to or availably of external resources influence its 
internal digital forensics posture? 
To examine this question, the research would need to leverage the digital forensic 
readiness scores established when answering research question one (RQ1). The main 
objective of this question was to support proximity relationships, as was stated in the 
hypothesis one (HP1).  
HP1. Law enforcement agencies within the state of Maryland that are within a 20-mile 
radius of the two primary central hubs, Baltimore, MD, and Washington D.C., will exhibit a 
more mature digital forensic readiness posture. 
To clarify, a more mature digital forensics posture would be reflected as a higher 
digital forensic readiness score, as was calculated during the examination of RQ1. Once the 
agencies' scores were tabulated, it was necessary to determine the proximity between each 
agency and both hubs. This was accomplished by using Google Earth to plot the distances 
between the hubs. It must be noted that the distances to the hubs were approximate distances.  
During an initial assessment, it was determined that no agency fell within the 
intersection zone of the two hubs. A total of nine agencies did fall within the twenty-mile 
radius of at least one of the hubs. A total of three agencies fell within the twenty-mile radius 
of Baltimore, MD. Of the nine, the remaining six fell within the twenty-mile radius of 
Washington, DC.  
It was found that no relationship existed between an agency’s digital forensic 
readiness score and its proximity to either of the hubs. To ensure the validity of the data, both 
hubs were looked at independently and then combined to identify statistical significance. The 
first independent data set examined the relationships using Baltimore, MD, as the primary hub 
(See Figure 20).  
When examining the proximity relation to Baltimore, MD, it was determined that no 
discernable relationship was present. By examining the scatter plot (See Figure 20), it quickly 
becomes apparent that the distribution of scores as the distance increases or decreases is 
random. While pockets do exist, the goal was to determine the relationship from the hubs and 
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not the causality of potential pockets within the data. While not statistically significant, it was 
interesting to note that the agency exhibiting the highest readiness score, point-nine-nine-eight 
(.998), fell within the 20-mile radius of Baltimore, MD. An examination of the same data with 
Washington, DC, as the hub, yielded similar results (See Figure 21). 
Like the previous dataset, no correlation could be identified. Using the same scatter 
plot method, pockets were also noted; however, the pockets were not as highly concentrated. 
Again, the causality was outside the scope of this study, but something worth exploring with 
future research. To ensure that nothing was overlooked, the data would also be combined and 
interpreted (See Figure 22). 
The examination of the aggregated data also revealed nothing of significant value. 
With no correlation observed in the previous analysis, it was determined that enough data 
existed to refute hypothesis one (HP1). As such, it could be stated that an agency’s distance to 
central hubs in Maryland does not positively or negatively influence that agency’s digital 
forensic readiness posture. This does not suggest that influence cannot occur. For example, 
increased resource sharing could possibly increase scores, but efficiency would also be a 
factor. In other words, this finding represents what is and not what could be.  
Research Question Three (RQ3) & Hypothesis Two (HP2) 
RQ3. What impact, if any, does an agency's internal digital forensic readiness posture 
have over any internal backlogs of digital forensics evidence? 
Answering this question (RQ3) was dependent on the results of research questions one 
(RQ1) and two (RQ2). First, each agency needed an established digital forensic readiness 
score. These scores would be established earlier in the study (See Table 1). With the scores in 
place, it was then possible to proceed with determining the number of agencies that had 
outstanding backlogs. This was accomplished by first tallying the results of survey question 
twenty-one (Q21) followed by an examination of question twenty-two (Q22). 
No anomalies were noted in the data reported for question twenty-one (Q21); 
however, anomalies were noted for question twenty-two (Q22). These anomalies would 
require manual correction and an adjustment of the counts for question twenty-two (Q22). 
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This data would then be combined along with the corresponding digital forensic readiness 
scores to identify relationships. 
It should first be stated that the number of agencies reporting backlogs was 
significantly lower than anticipated. In fact, only four of the thirty agencies responding 
reported having a backlog. One thing that was noticed was that it appears that agencies with 
higher scores are more likely to have backlogs. A review of comments by agencies reporting 
not having a backlog suggested that reliance may exist on more capable organizations. Since a 
relationship could not be established, the next step was to determine if hypothesis number two 
(HP2) could be supported.  
Hypotheses number two (HP2) sought to prove that all agencies, regardless of their 
distance between the hubs, will exhibit similar digital evidence backlogs when viewed in 
relation to the populations of the county or municipality in which the agency is located. Like 
hypothesis one (HP1), the dataset (See Table 12) was insufficient to support this hypothesis 
(HP2). In order to have been able to support hypothesis two (HP2), the ideal sample would 
need to consist of one agency from each county within the state. It might have been possible 
to determine s relationship without a response from each county if the population contained a 
significant amount of data diversity. This was just not the case with this study.  
Findings summary 
While neither of the hypotheses (HP1 & HP2) was supported, two of the three 
research questions were able to be addressed. Research question one (RQ1) generated a 
dataset that can be used as a baseline for both future research and process improvement. 
Research question two (RQ2) determined that hubs within the state do not have a negative or 
positive influence over digital forensic readiness postures. This is an advantageous finding as 
it suggests a possible lack of resource sharing or even an over-reliance on other agencies or 
outside resources. Outside of the research questions, additional useful information was and 
can be derived from the collected data. 
For example, the responses relating to Cloud and IoT concerns was a good indicator of 
possible deficiencies within the state. These deficiencies may be the result of resource 
constraints, training gaps, or other issues yet to be identified. There is significantly more 
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information that could be extracted from the current dataset; however, validation will not be 
possible without increased participation rates. 
The lack of responses came as no surprise when considered in relation to previous 
studies (Flory, 2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010). Data from future studies, of a similar nature, 
are likely to be sparse until existing data can be leveraged in a positive and visible way. 
Moving forwards, it will be necessary for researchers and law enforcement alike to work 
together to realize improvements in national, state, and localized digital forensic readiness 
postures. Until then, it is important to continue to gather data and build upon the body of 
knowledge.  
Limitations 
This research had several limiting factors. This section presents each of these 
limitations. First, the technical limitations will be presented. The limitations of the 
methodology will then be discussed.  
Limitations - Technical 
In regards to technical limitations, it determined early on that the study may suffer 
from a lack of responses using the electronic contact method. This assumption was based on 
the results of a study of a similar nature (Flory, 2016). It was determined, based on time 
constraints, that publicly promoting the survey in a fair on consistent manner was not feasible. 
As such, respondents would be receiving an unsolicited email originating from an unknown 
source. In a world of cyber-crime, it could be reasonably inferred that the emails were 
phishing attempts. This may partially explain the large number of unopened emails. While 
this was considered a limiting factor, efforts were made to offset this by sending a paper 
survey. To avoid this problem type of problem, with future iterations of this type of research, 
it is strongly encouraged that the researcher(s) attempt to contact the respondents prior to 
sending any form of survey.  
Limitations - Methodology 
During this research, it was found that the quantitative methodology may have limited 
the presentation and interpretation of the data. It was determined that many of the underlying 
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factors, especially in regards to the perception-based questions, could not be fully explored 
using the quantitative methodology. An examination of the data collected may have been 
better served using a mixed-methods approach.  
It must be understood, though, that a mixed-methods approach would not have added 
any value when answering the proposed research questions. Answering these questions 
required actual numeric data without much consideration of the rationale behind the 
responses. As such, the quantitative methodology was the proper choice. This does, however, 
leave the door open to a future iteration in which the data is reexamined using a different lens.  
Research Challenges 
This research endeavor was not without challenges. From the inception, through to 
completion, a number of issues evolved during the process that impeded progress. This 
section details those challenges.  
Early in the research process, it was challenging to scope the research effort, given the 
lack of comparative data. It was found that a pattern existed within the literature that seemed 
to map to several key works. While the data gathered during each subsequent study 
contributed to the body of knowledge, they also left many questions unanswered or raised 
new questions. The idea of localization seemed to go noticed but was rarely explored (Flory, 
2016; Gogolin & Jones, 2010). This led to the identification of the need and the formulation 
of the research questions and hypotheses. Following the previous research patterns, it was 
determined that this research would also build on other works. 
It was determined that leveraging Flory’s (2016) pre-validated survey instrument 
would build on the current body of knowledge while at the same time generating new data. 
This new data would come from the generation of a digital forensic readiness scoring system. 
Such a system had never been examined using law enforcement agencies in the state of 
Maryland. The target population would then prove to be the next challenge.  
Getting the research approved by both the dissertation committee and the DSU-IRB 
was a significant challenge. Due to a lack of comparative data the committee decided that the 
number of research questions along with the hypotheses might be aggressive. Careful scoping 
of the effort would alleviate some of these concerns and provide the pathway forward. 
Receiving approval from the DSU-IRB, on the other hand, would prove more challenging. 
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This challenge would eventually be overcome after several revisions to the statement of 
consent.  
Once the approvals had been realized, the next step was the execution of the plan, as 
detailed in Chapter 3. This involved generating one-hundred-forty-one paper surveys and 
creating an online version of the survey. During the collection phase, four paper surveys were 
received that lacked this unique agency identification code. This was due to the respondent 
ripping off the cover sheet, which contained the unique code. This action was not anticipated. 
As such, a better system should have been derived. This error resulted in the exclusion of 
these responses during the examination of  research questions two (RQ2) and three (RQ3). 
This was problematic considering the already low response rate. 
Limited data came as no surprise, but did present challenges. It was found that the 
survey instrument sent contained several minor errors. While minor, these errors may have 
resulted in some of the anomalies noted in Chapter 4. A careful review of the anomalies did 
eventually lead to a stable dataset.  
While these challenges did impact the overall timeline of the project, they did not 
cause a complete halt. In fact, these challenges could be viewed as positive in that they 
brought to light errors in the approach. As such, these challenges have been presented here to 
assist other researchers in avoiding similar problems.  
Future Work 
As was noted in a previous section, the methodology selected was specific to the 
research questions that guided this project. There is still a significant amount of value in the 
data collected if viewed from a different lens. A reinterpretation of this data using either a 
qualitative or mixed methods methodology may bring additional details to light. As such, it 
could be said that this research only scratches the surface. 
From the perspective of Maryland, it is believed that this research contains enough 
data to formulate ways to improve digital forensic readiness postures throughout the state. 
This could invole monitoring the readiness values over a period of months or years. The 
digital forensic readiness scoring system itself could also act as the basis for future research 
using a design science approach creating a unified monitoring and reporting system. This 
system could eventually be scaled to include other states, regions, or even the whole county. 
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By examining additional states, it may also be possible to further explore the 
proximity relationships that were presented in this paper. Further validating or refuting 
proximity relationship could provide a common way for federal, state, and local officials to 
determine ways to address resource distribution issues. In addition, findings related to 
backlogs need to be further examined as any noted similarities in future iterations may 
indicate a common bottleneck within the law enforcement community.  
Beyond the issues noted above, there may be other valuable nuggets contained within 
the current dataset that should be examined. For example, there are likely other relationships 
that have yet to be realized that can continue to build upon the current body of knowledge. 
The key to discovering these relationships will be through reexamination and repeated 
iterations 
Conclusion 
This research sought to answer three research questions and support two hypotheses. 
The first research question (RQ1) sought to determine the current digital forensic readiness 
posture of law enforcement agencies in the state of Maryland. The second research question 
(RQ2) sought to determine if an agency's proximity to or availably of external resources 
influence its internal digital forensic posture. The third research question (RQ3) sought to 
determine what impact, if any, does an agency's internal digital forensic readiness posture 
have over any internal backlogs of digital forensic evidence. Hypothesis one (HP1) mapped 
directly to question two (RQ2), and hypothesis two (HP2) mapped to research question three 
(RQ3).  
The research successfully assessed the digital forensic readiness posture of a sample of 
law enforcement agencies in the state of Maryland and assigned each of these agencies a 
digital forensic readiness score. It was found that proximity to a hub does not appear to 
contribute in either a positive or negative way to an agency’s digital forensic readiness score. 
Finally, based on the limited data, no trends could be identified that suggest either a negative 
or positive correlation between the digital forensic readiness scores and backlogs, thus 
negating the digital forensic readiness scores as a reliable predictive indicator.  
This study directly contributes to the current body of knowledge. Specifically, it adds 
data from a state that has not been previously explored in this way. In addition, this data acts 
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as an additional form of validation for previous studies, such as the one conducted by Flory 
(2016). Most importantly, this data, if used appropriately, has the potential to improve public 
safety and operations of law enforcement agencies in the state of Maryland and across the 
country.   
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